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INTRODUCTION
This Article contends that the structure and processes of energy
utility regulation in the United States perpetuate environmental injustice.
The inequitable distribution of the benefits and harms of fossil fuel energy generation and infrastructure is widely recognized.1 However, the
only mechanisms currently available to redress environmental injustices
1 See, e.g., Kathiann M. Kowalski, How Energy Issues and Civil Rights Issues Intersect, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (June 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/2CC8-CBEA; Kendra
Pierre-Louise, The Fossil Fuel Industry’s Legacy of White Supremacy, SIERRA CLUB (Apr. 2,
2021), https://perma.cc/ETV5-PKFW.
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in the utility sector are arcane, invisible, and inaccessible to the Black,
Brown, and low-income communities who are most affected.2 Regulatory institutions—which make highly consequential decisions about how
gas and electricity are produced and distributed and who bears the
costs—claim to be guided in their decision-making by ostensibly neutral
principles such as prudence, safety, reasonableness, and reliability.3 But,
as this Article will demonstrate, these bland and purportedly neutral
guiding principles conceal a system that is designed to protect and benefit the very industry subject to regulation. By playing this role, the regulatory system works hand-in-glove with the utility sector and the fossil
fuel industry to produce outcomes that disproportionately harm communities of color.
This Article explores the role of a key administrative proceeding—
the utility “rate case”—in facilitating the siting of fossil fuel infrastructure in Black, Brown, and low-income communities. The Article uses as
a case study the efforts of investor-owned utility National Grid to build a
massive gas pipeline and associated Liquefied Natural Gas (“LNG”) infrastructure in Brooklyn, New York.4 For two years, frontline communities have used a range of tactics to prevent completion of the pipeline
and LNG infrastructure,5 including participation in the utility regulation
process.6 Although community groups have successfully delayed—and
may entirely block—construction of some of the infrastructure as a result of their creative, multi-pronged advocacy and organizing strategy,7
the serious limitations of the regulatory process in advancing their
2

See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Mission Statement, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., https://perma.cc/936PUNFK (last updated Aug. 31, 2018); see also Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, A Triple
Bottom Line for Electric Utility Regulation: Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental,
and Consumer Protection Goals, 38 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1, 3 (2013); see also Susan D. Fendell, Public Ownership of Public Utilities: Have Stockholders Outlived Their Useful Economic Lives?, 43 OHIO STATE L.J. 821, 827 (1982).
4 See Kim Fraczek & Karen Edelstein, New Yorkers Mount Resistance Against North
Brooklyn Pipeline, FRACTRACKER ALL (May 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/AV9H-MHPQ.
5 See Stop the North Brooklyn Pipeline, NO N. BROOKLYN PIPELINE, perma.cc/XE62DMUN (last visited Mar. 24, 2022).
6 See generally Ruling on Party Status, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309, Sr. No.
896 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. June 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/B7U2-9WHB; Ruling on
Party Status, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l
Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309, Sr. No. 866 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv.
July 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/G3EY-FFX8; Ruling on Party Status, In re Rates, Charges,
Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No.
19-G-0310 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Oct. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/GU96-AZ73.
7 See Samantha Maldonado, Judge Temporarily Freezes Plan to Truck Frigid Liquid
Natural Gas to Brooklyn, CITY (Aug. 5, 2021), https://perma.cc/U2SQ-5UV5; see also NO
N. BROOKLYN PIPELINE, supra note 5.
3
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struggle for environmental justice are patent. The Article draws on the
National Grid case study to expose the procedural injustice of the utility
regulation system in the United States. This procedural injustice facilitates the inequitable distribution of environmental burdens resulting
from utility companies’ activities. Ultimately, the Article advances the
position that the private, profit-driven utility model is fundamentally incompatible with environmental and energy justice and must be replaced
with an alternative, publicly owned energy system.
I - THE “PERVERSE INCENTIVE” AND ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
Since 2016, investor-owned utility National Grid has sought to significantly expand its gas infrastructure in New York City and recover
the costs of this expansion from customers through administrative proceedings called “rate cases.”8 This Section begins with a brief explanation of investor-owned utilities and how they operate, followed by a description of National Grid’s planned infrastructure expansion and two
most recent rate cases. The Section goes on to argue that National Grid
and other investor-owned utilities have a “perverse incentive” to build
expensive physical infrastructure, even when customers’ needs can be
met with cheaper, energy-efficient, clean, and renewable alternatives.
The Section concludes by describing the adverse environmental, climate, and energy impacts of this “perverse incentive” on communities
affected by fossil fuel infrastructure, who are disproportionately Black,
Brown, and low-income.
A. National Grid’s Fossil Fuel Infrastructure Expansion
In 1898, Samuel Insull, founder of the Chicago-based Commonwealth Edison electric company, first proposed the idea of the “regulatory compact.”9 Insull realized that (1) the utility industry is a type of
“natural monopoly” because competition between for-profit utility companies results in duplication of expensive infrastructure and higher costs
for customers;10 and (2) the “logical and necessary corollary” of the natural monopoly principle is “the principle of public control”11—that is,

8 See Investing in the Future of Energy in NYC and LI, NAT’L GRID, https://
perma.cc/46PX-6GVZ (last visited Feb. 27, 2022); NAT’L GRID, THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN
NEW YORK CITY AND LONG ISLAND (2016), https://perma.cc/CU74-KPQK; see generally
Major Rate Case Process Overview, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., https://perma.cc/
57DY-B3SN (last updated Sept. 23, 2011).
9 Forrest McDonald, Samuel Insull and the Movement for State Utility Regulatory
Commissions, 32 BUS. HIST. REV. 241, 241-42 (1958).
10 See id. at 243.
11 See id.
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regulation. Since utility companies have monopolies to provide essential
services in specific geographic locations, the company’s customers are
captive (unable to take their business elsewhere) and vulnerable to price
gouging, poor service, and other forms of corporate abuse in the absence
of regulation.12 By 1916, 33 states had established public utility commissions to regulate monopoly utilities, and the regulatory compact was
widely accepted.13 The dual principles of the regulatory compact—
monopoly in exchange for regulation—remain the bedrock of the utility
regulation system today.14
There are three types of gas and electric distribution companies: investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”), publicly-owned utilities, and—in the
case of electric utilities only—rural electric cooperatives.15 Publiclyowned utilities are not-for-profit, locally controlled, and governed by
elected or appointed boards that are accountable to the public.16 IOUs
are for-profit enterprises governed by private boards and owned by
shareholders who “generally are not customers of the utility or members
of the community.”17 The main objective of an IOU, then, is to increase
shareholder value.18 Meanwhile, the IOU’s customers or “ratepayers”—
all the residents and businesses in the serviced area—“have no voice in
the operation of the utility.”19
Investor-owned utilities are regulated by state public utility commissions, while publicly-owned utilities generally either are exempt
from regulation by public utility commissions or are subject to limited
regulation.20 Public utility commissions are charged with ensuring that
investor-owned utilities “provide reasonable, adequate and efficient service to customers at just and reasonable prices.”21 Simultaneously, “regulators must provide utilities with a reasonable opportunity to recover
the costs incurred [in] providing service, including a fair return to inves-

12

Fendell, supra note 3, at 821-22.
McDonald, supra note 9, at 251.
14 See generally Kenneth Rose, Electric Power: Traditional Monopoly Franchise Regulation and Rate Making, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY 289 (Cutler J. Cleveland ed., 2004).
15 Anodyne Lindstrom & Sara Hoff, Investor-owned Utilities Served 72% of U.S. Electricity Customers in 2017, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN: TODAY IN ENERGY (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://perma.cc/RD2E-2S6G.
16 AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, PUBLIC POWER FOR YOUR COMMUNITY 7-11 (2016), https://
perma.cc/P8R2-QV59.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, STATE CLIMATE AND ENERGY TECHNICAL FORUM
BACKGROUND DOCUMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF PUC S FOR STATE ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY
OFFICIALS 1 (2010), https://perma.cc/R9JN-RFPH.
21 Id.
13
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tors.”22 Although the primary responsibility of public utility commissions is “economic in nature,”23 the scope of this responsibility extends
far beyond setting utility delivery rates: public utility commissions also
oversee utility companies’ processes for resource planning, procurement, and management; determine clean energy targets, budgets, and
sources of funding; and develop utility incentives for energy efficiency.24
The Brooklyn Union Gas Company, doing business as “National
Grid,”25 is an investor-owned utility26 that distributes and sells gas to
approximately 1.3 million customers in New York City.27 Since 2016,
National Grid has sought to significantly expand its gas infrastructure in
New York City by constructing an approximately 40,000-foot-long (7.5mile), 30-inch-wide, high-pressure (350 psi) gas transmission pipeline—
euphemistically named the “Metropolitan Reliability Infrastructure Project”28 but widely known as the North Brooklyn Pipeline—along with
two new LNG vaporizers29 and an LNG Trucking Station30 at the company’s LNG facility in Greenpoint, Brooklyn. All of this fossil fuel infrastructure would be located in and near communities of color and lowincome communities.31
In addition to applying for permits and approvals to proceed with
construction of the infrastructure,32 National Grid has sought to recover
22

Id. at 2.
Id.
24 Id. at 2-4.
25 Brooklyn Union Gas Co/The, BLOOMBERG, https://perma.cc/99FB-VV79 (last visited
Mar. 27, 2022).
26 Our Company, NAT’L GRID, https://perma.cc/9LK2-GCA7 (last visited Mar. 27,
2022).
27 NAT’L GRID, THE BROOKLYN UNION GAS COMPANY: CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE YEARS ENDED MARCH 31, 2020, 2019, AND 2018 10 (2020),
https://perma.cc/JE6D-WDKR.
28 KEDNY-KEDLI Book 4-NY at 1, 82, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 16-G-0059 (N.Y.
State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Jan. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/6QY6-FSQS; Request for Information No. DPS-556 at 2, 77, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union
Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case no. 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub.
Serv. June 24, 2019) (on file with authors), https://perma.cc/R73G-WHGV.
29 GIOP SS Filing Package at 13, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn
Union Gas Co. d/b/a National Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309, Sr. No. 696
(N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Dec. 13, 2019) [hereinafter GIOP Filing Package],
https://perma.cc/8ZTN-665F.
30 Id. at 13-14.
31 See infra Figures 1 and 2.
32 See SANE-16 Response, Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas
Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv.
Dec. 1, 2020) (on file with authors), https://perma.cc/B2B8-VLU5; NONBKPIPELINE-1
23
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the costs of these investments—plus a profit—from ratepayers.33 In New
York, the state public utility commission charged with regulating IOUs
is the New York Public Service Commission (“PSC”).34 The administrative proceeding through which IOUs seek the PSC’s permission to increase their customer rates is known as a “rate case.”35 In January 2016,
National Grid filed a rate case with the PSC.36 In its filings, the company
described plans to significantly increase its investments in gas infrastructure—including by building the North Brooklyn Pipeline—and
asked to recover the costs of these investments from ratepayers over the
next three years.37 In December 2016, the PSC approved National Grid’s
request to recover $165,232,000 from ratepayers in 2017, 2018, and
2019 for the North Brooklyn Pipeline.38 The pipeline, which was divided into five “phases,” would begin in Brownsville and end at the company’s LNG facility in Greenpoint.39
By the time National Grid filed its next rate case in April 2019, the
first two of the pipeline’s five phases were “nearing completion with

Response, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l
Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Sept. 11, 2020)
(on file with authors), https://perma.cc/EF6Q-Y68Y; Attachment 1 to NONBKPIPELINE-1
Response, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l
Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Aug. 24, 2020)
(on file with authors), https://perma.cc/B85E-TVUK.
33 2016 KEDNY Major Rate Case Filing at 1-2, Rates, In re Charges, Rules and Reguls.
of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 16-G-0059 (N.Y.
State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 KEDNY Major Rate Case Filing],
https://perma.cc/K9DL-W7C2; 2019 KEDNY Major Rate Case Filing, In re Rates, Charges,
Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No.
19-G-0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Apr. 30, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 KEDNY Major
Rate Case Filing], https://perma.cc/L9CU-GMCT.
34 See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law Ch. 48 Art. 1 § 5 (2021).
35 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 8.
36 2016 KEDNY Major Rate Case Filing, supra note 33, at 1-2.
37 KEDNY-KEDLI Book 1 at 4, 20-21, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 16-G-0059 (N.Y.
State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter KEDNY-KEDLI Book 1], https://
perma.cc/8Z4R-FPUM (requesting permission for $245 million in rate increase over threeyear period to offset gas infrastructure investments).
38 Order Adopting Terms of Joint Proposal and Establishing Gas Rate Plans at 140, In
re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for
Gas Service, Case No. 16-G-0059 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Dec. 16, 2016),
https://perma.cc/3VUK-5N29; Joint Proposal and Accompanying Summary at 199, In re
Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas
Serv., Case No. 16-G-0059 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Sept. 7, 2016),
https://perma.cc/QS7D-H4FW.
39 KEDNY-KEDLI Book 4-NY, supra note 28, at 86; Samantha Maldonado, Polls Call
on Hochul to Revisit Rate Hike Tied to Controversial Brooklyn Pipeline, CITY (last updated
Sep. 18, 2021, 9:39 PM), https://perma.cc/JS77-4TUU.
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approximately 20,000 feet of main installed.”40 In the 2019 rate case,
National Grid sought an additional $184,670,417 over the next three
years (2020, 2021, and 2022) for the North Brooklyn Pipeline,41 along
with a total of $51,230,000 for an LNG Trucking Station42 and two new
LNG vaporizers at the company’s Greenpoint facility.43
According to National Grid, the North Brooklyn Pipeline, LNG vaporizers, and LNG Trucking Station are all interconnected and interdependent: the vaporizers would “regasify” LNG, converting it from liquid
to gas that would then exit the Greenpoint facility via the North Brooklyn Pipeline and other pipelines.44 LNG transported by truck to the
Greenpoint facility and unloaded at the LNG Trucking Station would
then be used to refill the vaporizers.45
The PSC voted unanimously in August 2021 to allow customer
rates to be increased so that National Grid could recover costs for the
first four phases of the North Brooklyn Pipeline, which were already
constructed by that time.46 As of this writing, community groups continue to engage in efforts to halt construction of the fifth and final phase of
the pipeline, the LNG vaporizers, and the LNG Trucking Station,47 for
which rate recovery has not yet been approved but may be approved in
the future.48

40

GIOP KEDNY Filing Package at 51, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y.
State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Apr. 30 2019), https://perma.cc/84AP-RSLM.
41 GIOP KEDNY C&U Filing Package at 73, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y.
State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. July 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/7HTA-3W3B (seeking $88,940,732
for project phases 1-4 in 2020, $35,425,601 for phases 1-4 and $39,574,399 for phase 5 in
2021, and $20,729,685 for phase 5 in 2022).
42 Id. (budgeting $1,865,000 in 2020, $2,100,000 in 2021, and $12,265,000 in 2022 for
the LNG Trucking Station).
43 GIOP SS Filing Package, supra note 29 at 14 (budgeting $1,000,000 in 2020,
$13,000,000 in 2021, and $20,000,000 in 2022 for Vaporizers 13 and 14).
44 See NAT’L GRID, NATURAL GAS LONG-TERM CAPACITY SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT FOR
BROOKLYN, QUEENS, STATEN ISLAND AND LONG ISLAND (“DOWNSTATE NY”) 48-50 (May
2020), https://perma.cc/2H7K-WBPZ.
45 Id. at 52.
46 See Liz Donovan, National Grid Secures Gas Rate Hike Attached to Controversial
Brooklyn Pipeline, CITY LIMITS (Aug. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/WP2C-L8DD.
47 See Erin Conlon, No North Brooklyn Pipeline Coalition Looks Ahead After Gas Bill
Hike Approval, GREENPOINTERS (Aug. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/6794-XDM3; Anna
Conkling, The Fight Against the North Brooklyn Pipeline Continues with a Decision on Feb.
7, BUSHWICK DAILY (Jan. 13, 2022), https://perma.cc/3ZWT-DPH6.
48 Id.; see PSC Dramatically Slashes National Grid Rate Hike Request, N.Y. STATE
PUB. SERV. COMM’N (Aug. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/AH7X-W27V.
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B. The “Perverse Incentive” of Investor-Owned Utilities
After the landmark Supreme Court case Munn v. Illinois—which
held that private industries can be regulated when they are “affected
with a public interest”—the Court set out a test to determine whether an
industry is so affected.49 In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, the Court considered “the indispensable nature of the service
and the exorbitant charges and arbitrary control to which the public
might be subjected without regulation” to ascertain whether that industry was affected with a public interest, justifying regulation.50 It is these
two characteristics of IOUs—the essential nature of the services that
IOUs provide and their “natural monopoly” status, which would lead to
“exorbitant charges and arbitrary control” in the absence of regulation—
that make them subject to regulation by public utility commissions.51
Thus, “the state perceives the problem with monopoly utilities to be lack
of competition,” and “[t]he regulatory process attempts to produce the
same economic results as would occur naturally in a competitively structured industry.”52 As this Article argues, the state misdiagnoses the
problem with IOUs. The regulatory process does not and cannot prevent
the harmful financial, environmental justice, and climate impacts of
IOUs on the public. The incentive structure built into the regulatory process lies at the heart of this fundamental inability of IOUs to serve the
public interest.
IOUs, like all businesses, have two types of expenses: operating
expenses and capital expenses.53 Operating expenses are expenses incurred through everyday business operations, such as employees’ salaries and rent for offices.54 Capital expenses are major, long-term expenses on physical assets such as pipelines and other gas
infrastructure.55 Under the current model of utility regulation, IOUs can
shift their operating expenses onto ratepayers, but they do not recover
anything beyond what they spent; in other words, IOUs cannot make a
profit from their operating expenses.56 With capital expenses, however,
IOUs can recover not only their investment in the infrastructure but also
49

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct. of Indus. Relations of State of Kan., 262 U.S. 522,
538 (1923).
51 Fendell, supra note 3, at 821.
52 Id. at 822.
53 See Christina Majaski, Operating Expense vs. Capital Expense: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 28, 2022), https://perma.cc/ZAK9-HJ23.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 David Roberts, The Simple Reason Most Power Utilities Suck, VOX (Sept. 4, 2017,
1:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/6/29/12038074/power-utilities-suck.
50
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a return on equity (“ROE”)—the profit or net income expressed as a
percentage of the investment.57
Herein lies the “perverse incentive.”58 An IOU may be able to meet
customers’ energy needs with minimal capital expenditure (for example,
by implementing energy efficiency measures that would reduce demand
for gas or electricity) or with no capital expenditure at all (for example,
by implementing a demand-side management program in which customers who use less gas or electricity during periods of high demand are
rewarded).59 But because of the potential for ROE recovery, IOUs are
incentivized to build expensive infrastructure: the more that IOUs invest
in infrastructure, the higher their profits.60 As the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency has acknowledged, “[u]nder traditional [public utility
commission] regulation, a utility’s throughput incentive (i.e., the incentive to maximize sales in order to increase profit), is in conflict with an
aggressive pursuit of energy efficiency.”61
Indeed, it has long been noted that “utilities may perform unnecessary capital work on which they earn a return rather than cheaper, simpler operations and maintenance work on which they don’t.”62 Capital
spending by U.S. gas and electric IOUs has skyrocketed from $69 billion in 2008 to about $115 billion in 2016.63
As others have pointed out, two additional aspects of the utility
regulation system compound the “perverse incentive.”64 First, once a
public utility commission approves a customer rate hike so that an IOU
can recover its capital expenses plus ROE, the IOU recovers the ap-

57 See Heather Payne, Private (Utility) Regulators, 50 ENV’T L. 999, 1019-1025 (2020);
see also LISA FONTANELLA, RRA REGULATORY FOCUS MAJOR RATE CASE DECISIONS:
JANUARY - DECEMBER 2020 1 (Feb. 2, 2021) https://perma.cc/Z6Y6-W36C (noting that nationwide, the average ROE authorized for gas utilities in rate cases decided in 2020 was
9.46%).
58 Roberts, supra note 56; see also MELISSA WHITED ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON.,
INC., UTILITY PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE MECHANISMS: A HANDBOOK FOR REGULATORS 46
(Mar. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/9P6L-RGE9.
59 J.C. Kibbey, Utility Accountability 101: How Do Utilities Make Money?, NAT’L. RES.
DEF. COUNCIL (Jan. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/M2FV-BZZG.
60 See Rebecca Smith, Utilities’ Profit Recipe: Spend More, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2015,
6:04 PM), https://perma.cc/PYM8-2689; see also Mark Paul, Can Public Ownership of Utilities Be Part of the Climate Solution?, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2019, 1:36 PM),
https://perma.cc/76XT-73X2; see also id.
61 U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 20, at 4.
62 Katharine M. Mapes et al., Retooling Ratemaking: Addressing Perverse Incentives in
Wholesale Transmission Rates, 42 ENERGY L.J. 339, 345 (2021).
63 DELOITTE CTR. FOR ENERGY SOLUTIONS, FROM GROWTH TO MODERNIZATION: THE
CHANGING CAPITAL FOCUS OF THE US UTILITY SECTOR (2016), https://perma.cc/SQR2H2GE.
64 See Mapes et al., supra note 62.
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proved rate even if its capital expenses are ultimately lower than forecasted.65 Second, public utility commissions do not earmark the approved rate funds: although “component costs are used to support a rate
determination” in rate cases,66 IOUs need not spend the entirety of the
capital expenses advanced in a rate case on capital projects.67 Instead,
“the actual revenue collected from rates may be spent on any legitimate
business purpose, retained, or even distributed as dividends to investors.”68 Thus, IOUs are incentivized to artificially inflate capital expenses—at ratepayers’ expense—because excess profits can be retained or
given to investors.
National Grid claims that its massive infrastructure expansion is
necessary to meet future demand for gas,69 but recent analyses have
found that the company overestimates demand for gas.70 One of these
analyses concluded that “[i]n fact, National Grid is expected to have a
substantial surplus of supply capacity by 2034/35” (emphasis added).71
With energy demand slowing, National Grid is likely expanding its gas
infrastructure to increase profits, not to meet customers’ needs—a predictable outcome of the utility regulation system, which gives National
Grid a “perverse incentive” to build expensive physical infrastructure.
Later sections of this Article will show that the “perverse incentive”
is a symptom of a deeper problem: an energy system driven by private,
profit-driven IOUs that are unaccountable to the people directly affected
by their operations. As others have noted, such a system is fundamentally at odds with the emerging concept of “energy sovereignty,” which
prioritizes “the rights of communities and individuals to make their own

65

Id.
Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See KEDNY-KEDLI Book 1, supra, note 37, at 36-38.
70 See KENJI TAKAHASHI ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., ASSESSMENT OF
NATIONAL GRID’S LONG-TERM CAPACITY REPORT: NATURAL GAS CAPACITY NEEDS AND
ALTERNATIVES 1-2 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/JKW3-DVEZ; see also SUZANNE
MATTEI, 350.ORG & 350 BROOKLYN, FALSE DEMAND: THE CASE AGAINST THE WILLIAMS
FRACKED GAS PIPELINE 3 (Mar. 2019), https://perma.cc/9R6T-MAMJ; SUZANNE MATTEI ET
AL., INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS, PROPOSED NESE GAS PIPELINE IN NEW
YORK: A BAD BARGAIN FOR RATEPAYERS AND TAXPAYERS (Apr. 2020), https://perma.cc/
KWY2-TX4Z.
71 Mattei, supra note 70, at 3. A ban on gas hookups for new construction in New York
City was signed into law in December 2021, suggesting that demand will continue to decline
in the future. See Deepa Shivaram, The Largest City in the U.S. Bans Natural Gas in New
Buildings, WBUR (Dec. 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/43H5-6698.
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choices regarding the forms, scales, and sources of energy as well as the
patterning and organization of energy usage.”72
C. Environmental Justice and Climate Impacts
The consequences of the “perverse incentive” are devastating for
communities affected by gas infrastructure as well as for the climate. It
is well-documented that fossil fuel infrastructure disproportionately burdens Black, Brown, and low-income communities.73 A recent study
found that gas pipelines, in particular, are concentrated in areas with
more socially vulnerable populations, raising environmental justice
“concerns associated with the inequitable distribution of hazards resulting from energy infrastructure.”74 Virtually the entire route of National
Grid’s North Brooklyn Pipeline is within state-designated “disadvantaged communities,” along with the company’s proposed LNG vaporizers and LNG Trucking Station.75 Forty-four and three tenths percent of
the population in the evacuation zone of the infrastructure is Black.76 In
the neighborhood of Brownsville, where the North Brooklyn Pipeline
begins, 68.4% of residents identify as Black and 25.6% of residents
identify as Hispanic.77
A significant proportion of the gas distributed through gas infrastructure is extracted using high volume hydraulic fracturing (“frack72 Chelsea Schelly et al., Energy Policy for Energy Sovereignty: Can Policy Tools Enhance Energy Sovereignty?, 205 SOLAR ENERGY 109, 109-12 (2020).
73 See, e.g., Maninder P.S. Thind et al., Fine Particulate Air Pollution from Electricity
Generation in the US: Health Impacts by Race, Income, and Geography, 53 ENV’T SCI. &
TECH. 14010 (2019) (showing that across income levels, Black Americans have the highest
mortality rate from particulate matter air pollution caused by electricity generation); LESLEY
FLEISCHMAN & MARCUS FRANKLIN, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE & NAACP, FUMES ACROSS THE
FENCE-LINE (2017), perma.cc/V67F-DNAN; Ihab Mikati et al., Disparities in Distribution of
Particulate Matter Emission Sources by Race and Poverty Status, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
480 (2018); Paul Mohai et al., Racial and Socioeconomic Disparities in Residential Proximity to Polluting Industrial Facilities: Evidence From the Americans’ Changing Lives Study,
99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S649 (2009); Jill Johnston & Lara Cushing, Chemical Exposures,
Health and Environmental Justice in Communities Living on the Fenceline of Industry, 7
CURRENT ENV’T HEALTH REC. 48 (2020); TIM DONAGHY & CHARLIE JIANG, GREENPEACE,
FOSSIL FUEL RACISM (Charlie Jiang ed., 2021), perma.cc/ZU5U-7C6R.
74 Ryan E. Emanuel et al., Natural Gas Gathering and Transmission Pipelines and Social Vulnerability in the United States, 5 GEOHEALTH 1, 3 (2021).
75 See infra Figure 1.
76 See infra Figure 2.
77 New
York Neighborhood Data Profiles, N.Y. UNIV. FURMAN CTR.,
https://perma.cc/MK6S-LV7F (click on “BK16: Brownsville” in “Browse Neighborhood”
search bar) (last visited Apr. 26, 2021); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING ACCOUNTS FOR ABOUT HALF OF CURRENT U.S. CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (2016),
perma.cc/5YVF-7ZMY; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. CRUDE OIL AND NATURAL GAS
PROVED RESERVES, YEAR-END 2020 (2022), perma.cc/NG82-VVN4.
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ing”),78 which has even more severe health, environmental, and climate
impacts than conventional gas production.79 According to the U.S. Department of Energy, up to 95% of new wells drilled are hydraulically
fractured,80 and the U.S. Energy Information Administration has estimated that fracked gas accounts for two-thirds of U.S. gas production.81
The National Grid subsidiaries that service downstate New York purchase over half their winter gas supply from the Marcellus Shale region
of Pennsylvania,82 where fracking is used to extract shale gas.83 A significant proportion of the gas in National Grid’s North Brooklyn Pipeline and LNG infrastructure is therefore fracked gas from the Marcellus
Shale.
Gas pipelines can freeze, corrode, break, leak, catch on fire, and
explode, posing serious health and safety risks to the communities in
which they are sited.84 Pipelines leak large volumes of methane.85 One
study found that these leaks, or fugitive emissions, “contribute to the
risk of explosions in urban environments”—with 15% of the surveyed
leaks categorized as “potentially explosive”—and concluded that “[a]ll
leaks must be addressed, as even small leaks cannot be disregarded as
‘safely leaking.’”86 An analysis of nearly 9,000 significant pipelinerelated incidents in the U.S. from 1986 to 2016 found that these spills,

78 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ’S STATEMENT TO THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS ON DRIVING INNOVATION THROUGH FEDERAL
INVESTMENTS (2014), perma.cc/FC69-TJKD; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HYDRAULICALLY
FRACTURED WELLS PROVIDE TWO-THIRDS OF U.S. NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION (2016), perma.cc/PGP2-WJM5.
79 See generally CONCERNED HEALTH PROS. OF N.Y. & PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP.,
COMPENDIUM OF SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL, AND MEDIA FINDINGS DEMONSTRATING RISKS AND
HARMS OF FRACKING (UNCONVENTIONAL GAS AND OIL EXTRACTION) (7th ed. 2020),
https://perma.cc/LBD5-W2HR (providing a comprehensive and fully referenced compilation
of evidence detailing risks and harms of fracking).
80 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 78.
81 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 78.
82 See Request for Information No. SANE-17, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls.
of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case Nos. 19-G-0309 & 19G-0310 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Apr. 17, 2020) [hereinafter SANE-17 Response] (on
file with authors).
83 Peter Eavis, Fracking Once Lifted Pennsylvania. Now It Could Be a Drag., N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2020), perma.cc/DEZ3-FFYY.
84 CONCERNED HEALTH PROS. OF N.Y. & PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 79, at
42.
85 Zachary D. Weller et al., A National Estimate of Methane Leakage from Pipeline
Mains in Natural Gas Local Distribution Systems, 54 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 8958, 8958
(2020); Margaret F. Hendrick et al., Fugitive Methane Emissions from Leak-Prone Natural
Gas Distribution Infrastructure in Urban Environments, 213 ENV’T POLLUTION 710, 710
(2016).
86 Hendrick et al., supra note 85, at 710, 714.
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fires, explosions, and other accidents resulted in 548 deaths, more than
2,500 injuries, and over $8.5 billion in damages.87 In 2019 alone, there
were 652 reported pipeline incidents.88 Indeed, data suggest that new
pipelines are failing at about the same rate as gas transmission lines installed before the 1940s.89 Nearly 153,000 people live in the evacuation
zone of the North Brooklyn Pipeline, raising concerns about how a safe
evacuation would be undertaken in the event of a pipeline accident.90
The pipeline’s evacuation zone includes 81 daycare facilities, 63
schools, 13 healthcare facilities, and three nursing homes.91
In addition to fugitive emissions, methane and volatile organic
compounds (“VOCs”) are often intentionally leaked during routine pipeline maintenance and cleaning. Before devices called “pigs” are inserted
into the pipeline to remove debris, the pipeline is depressurized, venting
VOCs and methane.92 VOCs can produce serious health effects, including respiratory difficulty and organ damage.93 In environmental justice
communities, such as those along the route of the North Brooklyn Pipeline, health effects from additional fracked gas infrastructure threaten to
exacerbate pre-existing disparities in health.94 In Brownsville, for example, the 14% of adults who suffer from asthma (the highest rate in New
York City)95 are especially vulnerable to air quality impacts from the
North Brooklyn Pipeline’s emissions. In addition to air emissions,
communities along the pipeline route face health risks from radioactive
materials,96 which are unearthed during the gas drilling process and

87

Richard Stover, America’s Dangerous Pipelines, CTR. FOR BIO. DIVERSITY,
https://perma.cc/RXG3-BSM9 (last visited May 11, 2021); George Joseph, 30 Years of Oil
and Gas Pipeline Accidents, Mapped, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/7E7PBMWN.
88 Matt Kelso, 2021 Pipeline Incidents Update: Safety Record Not Improving,
FRACTRACKER ALL. (Apr. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/LBJ7-Y5UL.
89 Sara Smith, As US Rushes to Build Gas Lines, Failure Rate of New Pipes Has Spiked,
S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Sept. 9, 2015), perma.cc/9STV-9FWU.
90 Fraczek & Edelstein, supra note 4.
91 Id.
92 See Brittany Patterson, MarkWest Agrees to Pay Millions in Federal Settlement Over
‘Pig’ Emissions, W. VA. PUB. BROAD. (Apr. 26, 2018), perma.cc/B7ZL-NUSF.
93 See Volatile Organic Compounds, AM. LUNG ASS’N (Feb. 12, 2020), perma.cc/UKP42DGQ.
94 See CONCERNED HEALTH PROS. OF N.Y. & PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 79,
at 42.
95 See Andrea Leonhardt, Report Finds the City’s Highest Adult Asthma Rates in
Brownsville, BKREADER (Jan. 24, 2019), perma.cc/EU37-KFW9/.
96 See Justin Nobel, America’s Radioactive Secret, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 21, 2020),
perma.cc/28Y8-SNR4.
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build up in pipelines.97 Of all the geological formations from which gas
is extracted in the U.S., the Marcellus Shale—a major source of National Grid’s gas supply98—has tested the highest for radioactivity.99
The LNG infrastructure that National Grid seeks to install at its
Greenpoint facility also threatens the health and safety of surrounding
communities. The Greenpoint facility, which has stored and processed
LNG since 1968,100 is highly controversial.101 After an explosion of an
LNG storage tank on Staten Island killed 43 workers in 1973,102 New
York State instituted a moratorium on new LNG facilities.103 Preexisting facilities like National Grid’s, however, were unaffected.104 Today, while the moratorium on new LNG facilities remains in place in
New York City,105 National Grid plans to expand its facility by increasing the number of LNG vaporizers from six to eight106 and installing an
LNG Trucking Station.107 The company also seeks to transport LNG to
the Greenpoint facility by truck, which is prohibited in New York
City108 and requires a Fire Code variance from the New York City Fire
Department.109
As the Staten Island explosion made all too clear, LNG infrastructure and LNG transport pose catastrophic risks to public health and safety. LNG is a highly volatile, explosive fossil fuel that can flash-freeze
human flesh, cause second-degree burns on human skin within a one97 See Andrew W. Nelson et al., Understanding the Radioactive Ingrowth and Decay of
Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials in the Environment: An Analysis of Produced
Fluids from the Marcellus Shale, 123 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 689, 689 (Jul. 1, 2015).
98 See SANE-17 Response, supra note 82.
99 Nobel, supra note 96.
100 See NAT’L GRID, DRAFT UPLAND SITE SUMMARY 6 (2012), https://perma.cc/7QRXM5TE.
101 See, e.g., Press Release, Frack Outta Brooklyn & No N. Brooklyn Pipeline Coal.,
Caravan Action: “FDNY Shut Down the Head of the North BK Pipeline!” (Mar. 3, 2021),
perma.cc/7MF6-SDRE; see also e.g., Edward Cowans, Hazards Cited in Ship Delivery of
Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1972, at 26, https://perma.cc/CM2V-3LCW.
102 Robert D. McFadden, 43 Workers Buried in Huge Gas Tank Explosion and Fire on
Staten Island, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1973, at 1, https://perma.cc/YD8D-WUQD.
103 Jon Campbell, State Poised to Lift Liquefied Natural Gas Storage Moratorium,
POUGHKEEPSIE J. (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:25 PM), https://perma.cc/98T9-8QY9.
104 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 570 (2015).
105 Rachel Shapiro, State Ban on Liquefied Natural Gas Storage Remains in Effect for
New York City, SILIVE (Jan. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/4K6N-T5NC.
106 Id.; Rosemary Misdary, Greenpoint Residents, Local Leaders Call on Gov. Hochul to
Reject Natural Gas Permit, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 27, 2022), https://perma.cc/J9U3-5FKD; see
also Greenpoint Energy Center, NAT’L GRID, https://perma.cc/2CRV-6P34 (last visited Mar.
27, 2022).
107 GIOP SS Filing Package, supra note 29, at 72.
108 See N.Y.C. Fire Code §§ 2707.10.1, 3205.4.4 (2014).
109 See N.Y.C. Fire Code § 104.8 (2014).
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mile radius, and displace oxygen, resulting in asphyxiation.110 Created
by turning methane gas into a liquid through a cryogenic process, LNG
requires evaporative cooling to keep chilled.111 LNG tanks are therefore
intentionally leaky: gas is vented from the tanks to maintain the superchilled temperature of the LNG.112 National Grid seeks to install two
new LNG vaporizers,113 which rely on periodic flaring to control pressure during the regasification process.114 As a result of the need for venting and flaring—both of which release significant quantities of methane
into the air—the greenhouse gas emissions of LNG are 30% higher than
those of conventional gas.115
National Grid’s Greenpoint facility is located in and near statedesignated “disadvantaged communities”116 who have lived with toxic
industrial air pollution for decades117 and experienced some of New
York City’s slowest rates of improvement in air quality in recent
years.118 Moreover, the facility abuts Newtown Creek, which is a Superfund site, a dumping site for hazardous waste, and one of the most polluted waterways in the U.S.119 As a result of its previous (that is, preLNG) operations at the Greenpoint facility, National Grid has contributed to the contamination of Newton Creek,120 and sediments off the shore
of National Grid’s facility contain some of the site’s highest levels of
cancer-causing chemicals.121 Thus, the health and safety impacts of ad110

CONCERNED HEALTH PROS. OF N.Y. & PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP, supra note 79, at

393.
111
112
113
114

Id. at 43.
Id. at 392-93.
GIOP Filing Package, supra note 29, at 14 [hereinafter GIOP Filing Package].
CONCERNED HEALTH PROS. OF N.Y. & PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP, supra note 79, at

393.
115

Id. at 43.
See infra Figure 1.
117 See Welcome to ELI: Environmental Legacy and Improvements, N. BROOKLYN
NEIGHBORS, https://northbrooklynneighbors.org/eli (last visited Apr. 3, 2022); see also
KATHERINE SCHWARZ ET. AL, CMTY. ENV’T HEALTH CTR., RIGHT TO BREATHE/RIGHT TO
KNOW: INDUSTRIAL AIR POLLUTION IN GREENPOINT-WILLIAMSBURG, at vi (1992).
118 See id.; see also N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, NEW YORK CITY
COMMUNITY AIR SURVEY: NEIGHBORHOOD AIR QUALITY 2008-2016 app. 3 at 29-40 (2018),
https://perma.cc/X2ZB-S5M7.
119 Newtown Creek: Public Health Assessment, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH,
https://perma.cc/YBJ2-G3VT (last visited May 11, 2021).
120 See generally Cleanup Activities, Superfund Site: Newton Creek Brooklyn, Queens,
NY, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/P6XA-WEHT (last visited Apr. 21, 2022);
Enforcement, Case Summary: Settlement Reached at Newton Creek Superfund Site, U.S.
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/MG4A-84QV (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
121 See U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, Presentation at the Technical CAG Meeting: Newton
Creek Superfund Site, at 8 (Feb. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/6W64-WD2A; Hussein I. Abdel-Shafy & Mona S.M. Mansour, A Review on Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons: Source,
116
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ditional LNG infrastructure at the Greenpoint facility would compound
the pre-existing risks that surrounding environmental justice communities have long faced.
In addition to its disproportionate health, safety, and environmental
impacts on Black, Brown, and low-income communities, expansion of
gas infrastructure is fundamentally incompatible with achieving the
greenhouse gas emissions reductions that are necessary to avoid the
most cataclysmic impacts of climate change.122 Gas has the highest nearterm greenhouse gas emissions impact of all heating fuels, including
coal.123 This is due primarily to the leakage and venting of methane, a
highly potent greenhouse gas with a global warming potential 86 times
higher than that of carbon dioxide for its first 20 years in the atmosphere.124
In 2019, New York State recognized the dire reality of the climate
crisis when it enacted the landmark Climate Leadership and Community
Protection Act (“CLCPA”), which mandates a 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels) by 2030 and an 85% reduction
by 2050.125 National Grid’s additional gas infrastructure—which would
increase greenhouse gas emissions, prolong reliance on gas as an energy
source, and delay the transition to clean energy126—is inconsistent with
the requirements of the CLCPA127 and with growing calls for a rapid
phase-out of fossil fuels.128
Moreover, project applicants often try to “segment” large fossil fuel
projects into their constituent parts for purposes of obtaining needed
permits and approvals—a tactic to either minimize the appearance of a
project’s adverse environmental and climate impacts or evade environ-

Environmental Impact, Effect on Human Health and Remediation, 25 EGYPTIAN J.
PETROLEUM 107, 114, 116 (2016).
122 Letter from U.S. Scientists on the Fossil Fuel Era to President Joseph R. Biden (Oct.
7, 2021) [hereinafter Letter from U.S. Scientists], https://perma.cc/QDU5-EADA.
123 PACE Agree Direct Testimony EG at 19, In re Rates Charges, Rules and Regulations
of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. d/b/a National Grid for Electric Serv., Case Nos. 20-E0380 & 20-G-0381, Sr. No. 313 (N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nov. 30, 2020) [hereinafter
PACE Agree Direct Testimony EG], https://perma.cc/3TMW-NSFE.
124 Gunnar Myhre et al., Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 659, 714
(Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2014).
125 See S.B. 6599, S. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 75-0107(1) (N.Y. 2019).
126 See generally PACE Agree Direct Testimony EG, supra note 123.
127 See S.B. 6599, S. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ (1), (2)(a), (4) (N.Y. 2019).
128 See, e.g., PACE Agree Direct Testimony EG, supra note 123, at 2-3; Letter from U.S.
Scientists, supra note 122.
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mental review altogether.129 Even though National Grid has repeatedly
described the North Brooklyn Pipeline, LNG vaporizers, and LNG
Trucking Station as interconnected and interdependent,130 the company
has segmented this single, massive fracked gas expansion project into its
constituent parts, separately seeking permits and approvals for each of
the three pieces of infrastructure.131 Segmentation—defined as “the division of the environmental review of an action such that various activities
or stages” are treated “as though they were independent, unrelated activities”132—is prohibited by the New York State Environmental Quality
Review Act (“SEQRA”).133 New York agencies, in the authors’ view,
have failed to enforce SEQRA and prevent National Grid’s unlawful
segmentation of its expansion project.134 As a result, the project as a
whole has never undergone environmental review and two of the project’s three constituent parts—the North Brooklyn Pipeline and the LNG
Trucking Station—have each evaded environmental review.135
Finally, in addition to its environmental justice and climate impacts, National Grid’s expansion of fracked gas infrastructure would increase ratepayers’ “energy burdens”—the percentage of household income spent on energy bills136—since National Grid would raise
customer rates to recover the costs of the infrastructure (plus a percentage of those costs as profit for the company’s investors). Black, Brown,
and low-income households in the U.S. face disproportionately high energy burdens: according to a recent analysis, energy burden is 43%
higher for Black households and 20% higher for Hispanic households
than for non-Hispanic white households, and low-income households
spend three times more of their income on energy bills than non-lowincome households.137 Generally, the lower a household’s income, the

129 See Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Evaluating the Effects of Fossil Fuel Supply
Projects on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change Under NEPA, 44 WM. & MARY
ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 423, 428, 440 (2020).
130 See NAT’L GRID, supra note 44.
131 See sources cited supra note 32; see generally Complaint at 18-22, Sane Energy Project v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation, No. 706273/2021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens
Cty., Mar. 18, 2021) [hereinafter Complaint].
132 N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.2(ah) (2019).
133 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.3(g)(1) (2019).
134 See Complaint, supra note 131.
135 See generally id.
136 Off. of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Low-Income Community Energy
Solutions, STATE & LOC. SOL. CTR., https://perma.cc/TGM7-H8LH (last visited Mar. 22,
2022).
137 ARIEL DREHOBL ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., HOW HIGH
ARE HOUSEHOLD ENERGY BURDENS? AN ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL AND METROPOLITAN
ENERGY BURDEN ACROSS THE UNITED STATES, at iii (2020), https://perma.cc/M7TU-ZQFR.
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less energy the household uses;138 however, in addition to charges based
on energy usage, monthly energy bills include fixed charges regardless
of how much energy a household uses.139 These fixed charges disproportionately impact low-to-moderate-income households with higher energy burdens.140
Utility rate hikes also exacerbate “energy insecurity,” or the “inability to adequately meet basic household energy needs.”141 Black
households face the highest nationwide levels of energy insecurity at
any income bracket.142 In Detroit, African American households were
found to be several times more likely than non-African American
households to experience utility arrearage or shut-offs.143 Indigenous,
African American, and multiracial households nationwide have the
highest rates of home heating and cooling service losses, most frequently receive disconnection notices, and most often sacrifice other necessities to pay for energy services.144
As renowned law and energy scholar Shalanda Baker has written,
when disproportionate energy burdens and energy insecurity are considered together with disproportionate harms from fossil fuel infrastructure,
the implications are devastating: “Communities of color are disproportionately subsidizing an energy system that is killing them.”145

138

Table CE1.1 Summary Annual Household Site Consumption and Expenditures in the
U.S.—Totals and Intensities, 2015, in 2015 RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION SURVEY:
ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURES TABLES, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2018),
https://perma.cc/TZQ5-AVSY.
139 MELISSA WHITED ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON INC., CAUGHT IN A FIX: THE
PROBLEM WITH FIXED CHARGES FOR ELECTRICITY 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/9VRB-JPH4.
140 Id. at 2, 15-16.
141 Diana Hernández, Understanding ‘Energy Insecurity’ and Why It Matters to Health,
SOC. SCI. & MED., Aug. 2016, at 1, 2, https://perma.cc/B9JN-JSAP.
142 Sonal Jessel et al., Energy, Poverty, and Health in Climate Change: A Comprehensive Review of an Emerging Literature, FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH, Dec. 2019, at 1, 7,
https://perma.cc/FX84-PMMW.
143 Dominic J. Bednar et al., The Intersection of Energy and Justice: Modeling the Spatial, Racial/Ethnic and Socioeconomic Patterns of Urban Residential Heating Consumption
and Efficiency in Detroit, Michigan, 143 ENERGY & BUILDINGS 25, 27 (2017).
144 See CHANDRA FARLEY ET AL., GRID MODERNIZATION LAB’Y CONSORTIUM,
ADVANCING EQUITY IN UTILITY REGULATION: FUTURE ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION
REPORT NO. 12 at 21-26 (2021), https://perma.cc/ZH9J-KB8U.
145 Shalanda H. Baker, How to Create Anti-Racist Energy Policies, WBUR (Sept. 23,
2020), https://perma.cc/M43J-GRN2.
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Figure 1: National Grid’s North Brooklyn Pipeline and Greenpoint
LNG facility are located in state-designated “disadvantaged communities.” The shaded areas meet the criteria for “disadvantaged communities” as defined by New York State.146 Source: Sane Energy Project.

146 See Disadvantaged Communities, N.Y. STATE ENERGY & DEV., https://perma.cc/
EF3S-VYV8 (last visited May 12, 2022).
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Figure 2: The North Brooklyn Pipeline transmits fracked gas
through predominantly Black communities at a pressure of 350 poundforce per square inch (psi). A gas pipeline with a pressure of 350 psi has
an evacuation radius—also known as an evacuation zone or impact
zone—of about 1,275 feet.147 Source: Fractracker Alliance.
II - UTILITY RATE CASES IN NEW YORK
In theory, the utility rate case process provides an administrative
forum for oversight of proposed changes in utility fees and investments.
However, in an energy system centered on investor-owned monopoly
utilities, the utility rate case process is the mechanism by which these
companies ensure their continued ability to secure profits at the expense
of a captive market. This Section begins with an overview of utility rate
cases in New York, briefly describing both the process and the players
involved. The Section then discusses the legal standard for utility ratemaking and the principles that have been developed to guide ratemaking
policy.

147 See Kim Fraczek, New Yorkers Mount Resistance Against North Brooklyn Pipeline,
FRACTRACKER ALL. (May 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/FBM9-XXP4.
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A. Utility Rate Cases 101: The Process
In New York State, a rate case begins when an investor-owned utility submits a filing to the Department of Public Service (“DPS”), the
“staff arm” of the Public Service Commission,148 requesting an increase
to its “rate base” (and, consequently, customers’ delivery rates) and presenting its justification for the proposed rate increase.149 The filing includes estimates of the IOU’s capital expenses, operating expenses, depreciation costs, taxes, and rate of profit.150
The “rate base” is the net value of the IOU’s assets, on which the
IOU makes a profit.151 The rate base includes capital expenses but not
operating expenses;152 in other words, the amount of the IOU’s proposed
rate base increase is predicated solely on capital expenses—planned additions and improvements to the IOU’s energy production, transmission,
and distribution system. Thus, as discussed above, although the IOU recovers both its capital expenses and its operating expenses from ratepayers, capital expenses drive the IOU’s profitability.153
After an IOU initiates a rate case, the IOU is legally required to inform residents of the affected service areas about the proposed rate increase by publishing a notice once a week, for four consecutive weeks,
“in a newspaper having general circulation in each county containing
territory affected by the proposed change.”154 The newspaper notice
must “plainly state” the proposed changes “in a form and manner designed to be seen and understood” by affected ratepayers.155 No further
public notice requirements for proposed rate hikes are imposed on
IOUs.156 Moreover, the newspaper notice need not contain any information about the capital projects that the IOU seeks to undertake157—
that is, the gas or electricity infrastructure projects that would be driving
the increase in customers’ energy bills. The notice need not mention the
ongoing rate case in which the proposed rate increase is under delibera-

148 Meet the Commissioners, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., https://perma.cc/9YCLG8ZH (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
149 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 8.
150 Id.
151 Russell Ernst, Rate Base: Understanding a Frequently Misunderstood Concept, S&P
GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Mar. 3, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://perma.cc/73KB-S72X.
152 See Kibbey, supra note 59.
153 See supra Part I-B.
154 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 720-8.1(a) (1999); see also N.Y. PUB. SERV.
L. § 66(12)(b) (2021).
155 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 720-8.1(a) (1999).
156 See id.
157 See id.
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tion or inform concerned ratepayers about how they can get involved in
the rate case.158
Rate cases in New York must be decided within 11 months of the
filing date.159 During the first four months of a rate case (months 1-4),
DPS assembles a team “charged with the responsibility to analyze the
utility rate filing and represent the public interest.”160 The team consists
of attorneys, economists, accountants, financial analysts, engineers, and
consumer service specialists “who audit and investigate the company’s
proposals” and usually develop a counter-proposal to the rate filing.161
Other stakeholders (“intervenors”), including individual members of the
public as well as organizations and groups, can also become parties to
the rate case and develop their own testimony challenging the IOU’s
proposals.162 The discovery process, in which any party can serve any
other party with interrogatories and requests for documents (“Information Requests”), begins after a rate case is filed and generally continues throughout the case.163 An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is assigned to preside over the case and hear the evidence.164
Over the course of the next three months (months 5-7), the DPS
team and other stakeholders file their testimony, the IOU files rebuttal
testimony, and evidentiary hearings (including cross-examination of expert witnesses) are conducted.165 All written evidence and testimony
submitted by the IOU, DPS team, and other stakeholders, along with
transcripts of evidentiary hearings, are filed on the publicly accessible
DPS docket for the rate case,166 unless particular evidence is restricted
from public view as a result of a successful request for confidentiality by
the IOU.167
At any point during the rate case, the IOU can notify the parties that
it wishes to negotiate a settlement and then either (1) develop a draft of a
confidential “Joint Proposal,” confidentially negotiate this draft Joint
Proposal with the parties, arrive at a revised Joint Proposal through the
negotiation process, and publicly issue this agreed-upon Joint Proposal;
or (2) confidentially negotiate the original rate filing with the parties, ar158

See id.
N.Y. STATE DEP’T PUB. SERV., supra note 8.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, §§ 5.3(a), 5.4(a) (2011).
164 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 8.
165 Id.
166 See, e.g., Search/Commission Files, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., https://www3.
dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/FCFC9542CC5BE76085257FE300543D5E?OpenDocument
(enter “19-G-0309” in “Search by Case Number” field) (last visited Apr. 24, 2022).
167 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 6-1.3(b)(2) (2021).
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rive at a Joint Proposal through the negotiation process, and publicly issue this agreed-upon Joint Proposal.168 Settlement negotiations are completely confidential and generally consist of a back-and-forth between
the IOU and DPS about the terms of the Joint Proposal.169 The Joint
Proposal that emerges from these negotiations need not have been
agreed upon by all parties or even most parties negotiating.170 Generally,
the IOU and DPS are in agreement about the Joint Proposal and seek “to
convince some of the intervening parties to support” the proposal.171
However, there is no requirement that the IOU and DPS succeed in securing intervenor support, and ultimately, the Public Service Commission can approve a Joint Proposal that a significant number of intervenors oppose.172
In the final stage of the rate case (months 7-11), the parties file initial briefs and reply briefs in support of or in opposition to the Joint Proposal.173 Public hearings are held in the utility’s affected service areas.174
Notably, these public hearings generally occur after the Joint Proposal
has been agreed upon by parties in confidential negotiations, so there is
often no opportunity for the public to directly participate in the development of the Joint Proposal.175 The ALJ issues a “recommended decision,” that is, a recommendation that the Public Service Commission
adopt, adopt with modifications, or reject the Joint Proposal.176 Finally,
the Public Service Commission issues a written decision regarding the
Joint Proposal.177
B. Utility Rate Cases 101: The Players
Energy rate cases in New York are dominated by two parties: the
gas and/or electric IOU seeking the rate hike and the regulators charged
with representing the public interest.178 These regulators are officials
with the Department of Public Service, the “staff arm” of the state public utility commission (New York Public Service Commission) that ul168 Richard Berkley & Laurie Wheelock, Presentation on Participating in a NYS Public
Service Commission Rate Case at the 2019 LIFE Regional Meetings (May 14, 2019) at 8,
https://perma.cc/A6MZ-EC5N.
169 Id. at 9.
170 See id. at 9; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 8.
171 Berkley & Wheelock, supra note 168, at 9.
172 See id.; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 8.
173 See Berkley & Wheelock, supra note 168, at 7, 9; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV.,
supra note 8.
174 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 8.
175 See Berkley & Wheelock, supra note 168, at 9.
176 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 8.
177 See id.
178 See Berkley & Wheelock, supra note 168, at 5-10.
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timately decides the case.179 The seven members of the PSC are appointed by the governor.180
The interests of consumers are purportedly represented by another
state agency, the Utility Intervention Unit (“UIU”), which is housed in
the Department of State’s Division of Consumer Protection.181 The UIU
claims to “actively represent[] the interests of residential and small
commercial consumers before the PSC during utility rate cases,” asserting that its intervention in rate cases “help[s] ensure that customers can
access just and reasonable rates, that relevant consumer protections are
followed, and that providers maintain quality service.”182 However, as
others have noted, the UIU suffers from several serious limitations when
it comes to protecting consumer interests in rate cases. First, the UIU is
not an independent agency; the UIU’s operation under the authority of
the governor—who appoints the members of the PSC183—constrains its
advocacy on behalf of ratepayers.184 Second, the UIU is charged with
representing the interests of both residents and businesses—interests that
are not aligned and, in fact, are “frequently at odds.”185 Since costs are
allocated across different categories of customers in a rate case, the
UIU’s representation of both residential and business interests means the
agency is ill-equipped to advocate for residential customers when they
are saddled with an unjust share of costs as compared to businesses.186
In addition to the utility company and state agencies, parties to rate
cases might include representatives of cities and smaller municipalities,
nonprofit consumer and business advocates, real estate developers, other
energy interests, environmental groups, and members of the public.187
These prospective parties can apply to intervene in a rate case by submitting a Party Status Request Form.188 There is no funding available to
community intervenors in utility rate cases to defray expenses incurred

179

See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 148.
Id.
181 Utility Intervention Unit, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF STATE., https://perma.cc/6FC9-MLK7
(last visited May 11, 2022).
182 Id.
183 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 148.
184 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 148. Indeed, New York is one of
only seven states without an independent state consumer advocate’s office, and legislation to
create such an office was vetoed by Governor Kathy Hochul in December 2021. Julia Rock,
Hochul Vetoes Bill to Create Utility Consumer Advocate, N.Y. FOCUS (Dec. 8, 2021),
https://perma.cc/85YV-DDLD.
185 Rock, supra note 184.
186 See id.
187 See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 8.
188 See Service List and Party Status Request Forms, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF STATE,
https://perma.cc/RJ3T-8HHS (last visited May 11, 2022).
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in the rate case process;189 by contrast, in other administrative proceedings, New York State offers intervenors funds “to pay for expert witnesses, consultants, administrative costs (such as document preparation
and duplication) and legal fees.”190
C. The Legal Standard and Guiding Principles for Utility Ratemaking
When determining utility rates, the New York PSC—like all state
public utility commissions—is constrained by a highly “investororiented” legal standard. 191 According to the conventional understanding of two landmark Supreme Court cases that set out the test for state
regulation of utility rates, a rate that does not yield a “just and reasonable” profit for a utility company is an unconstitutional taking of property
without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment (applicable to
states through the Fourteenth Amendment).192
In Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service
Commission, the Court first reaffirmed the “well-settled” doctrine that
“[r]ates which are not sufficient to yield a reasonable return on the value
of the property used at the time it is being used to render the service are
unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, and their enforcement deprives
the public utility company of its property in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”193 The Court then held:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the
same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by
corresponding, risks and uncertainties . . . .194
Two decades later, the Court expanded on this standard in Federal
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., holding that a utility company’s return on equity “should be sufficient to assure confidence in the
189 The authors have found no information indicating the availability of funding for utility rate case intervenors in New York State.
190 See The Fund for Municipal and Local Parties: A Guide to Intervenor Funding Pursuant to Article 10 of the Public Service Law, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., https://
perma.cc/MVM7-KPND (last visited MAY 11, 2022) (providing information about the availability of intervenor funding for municipalities and “eligible local parties”—for example,
individuals who are directly affected by a proposed power plant—in Article 10 major energy
generation facility cases).
191 Fendell, supra note 3, at 821, 823.
192 See id. at 821-22.
193 Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West
Virginia., 262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923).
194 Id. at 692.
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financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.”195 Thus, “not only does the Supreme Court recognize the
cost of attracting private capital as a cost of providing utility service, the
Court makes the attraction of private capital, and thus the investor, the
focus and criterion by which the fairness of rates is determined.”196
Certainly, there are legal arguments to be made that utility rates are
not just “bounded on the low end by the concept of a ‘reasonable return’” but, in fact, “bounded on both sides to form a ‘zone of reasonableness.’”197 Law and economics scholar John N. Drobak has argued
that the “prevailing interpretation of utility ratemaking law,” which contends that “the Constitution requires rates to be set at levels high enough
to generate moderate profits for investors,” fails to account for the Supreme Court’s recognition of “a countervailing aspect [of the ratemaking standard]: the protection of the public interest.”198 According to
Drobak, significant financial harm to utility investors is permissible under the Constitution when justified by the public interest.199
Nevertheless, the fact that the predominant interpretation of utility
ratemaking doctrine may be wrong as a matter of law offers cold comfort to ratepayers and marginalized communities facing increasing energy burdens and energy insecurity. The legal system has not simply failed
to protect Black, Brown, and low-income communities suffering disproportionate financial and environmental harms as a result of the utility
ratemaking process;200 the legal system has, in fact, driven this inequity
by “regard[ing] dividends on stock as a cost” that captive ratepayers
must shoulder to receive essential services from monopoly utilities.201
The “investor-oriented” legal standard for utility ratemaking may
contribute, moreover, to what some experts believe are exorbitant ROEs
authorized by regulators for utility companies.202 According to a 2019
analysis of nearly 1,600 rate cases over a 38-year period, ROEs approved by public utility commissions “have exhibited a large and growing premium over the riskless rate of return.”203 The study’s authors
195
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found that the growing premium cannot be explained by traditional economic models and concluded that regulators are likely approving excessive ROEs that yield unreasonably high profits for utility companies.204
Beyond the legal standard, various thinkers—chief among them the
renowned finance scholar and utility expert James C. Bonbright—have
identified (non-legally binding) goals and principles of utility ratemaking that parties to rate cases continue to cite in support of their positions.205 In his seminal 1961 book, Principles of Public Utility Rates,
Bonbright articulated three “primary objectives” of ratemaking policy:
the “fair-return standard,” that is, the ability of private utility companies
to secure a profit; the “fair-cost-apportionment objective,” that is, the
fair distribution of costs among customers; and the “optimum-use or
consumer-rationing objective,” that is, optimal efficiency in energy
use.206 The “Bonbright Principles,” as they are known, also include several secondary attributes of a sound rate structure: rates should be simple, understandable, acceptable to the public, feasible in their application, non-controversial in their interpretation, stable, and nondiscriminatory.207
As Bonbright himself acknowledged, however, these principles are
ambiguous: “how, for example, does one define ‘undue discrimination’?” he asked.208 Indeed, the highly subjective nature of concepts like
fairness, simplicity, stability, and non-discrimination is precisely the
reason these principles form the contested terrain of rate cases. As the
next Section will show, ambiguity favors utility companies—not ratepayers—because regulators yield the definitions of these subjective
principles to the utilities that set the rate case agenda.
III - PROCEDURAL INJUSTICE IN UTILITY RATE CASES
Mirroring the meaning of “environmental justice,”209 “energy justice” encompasses both distributive justice (equitable dissemination of
“the benefits and costs of energy services”) and procedural justice (“how
[energy] decisions are made . . . or who is involved and has influence in
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decision-making”).210 Leading energy scholars Benjamin Sovacool and
Michael Dworkin have described procedural justice as consisting of
“four important elements: (1) access to information; (2) access to and
meaningful participation in decision-making; (3) lack of bias on the part
of decision-makers; and (4) access to legal processes for achieving redress.”211
Using the National Grid proceeding as an example, this Section argues that utility rate cases in New York are characterized by procedural
injustice, failing to ensure the full and informed involvement of communities in the energy decisions that will affect them. The Section describes some of the mechanisms that deprive affected communities of
meaningful participation in the rate case process, including insufficient
public notice requirements, the power of utility companies to set the rate
case agenda, steep information asymmetry between the parties, communities’ lack of resources and technical expertise, and the phenomenon of
“regulatory capture.”
This Article posits that, due in part to this lack of procedural justice, rate cases in New York fail to protect marginalized communities
from the adverse environmental and economic impacts of highly consequential energy decisions. Indeed, by procedural design, these tightlycontrolled administrative proceedings prioritize the financial viability of
investor-owned utilities over the rights and needs of ratepayers. Ultimately—and as the National Grid rate case demonstrates—utility regulators work hand-in-glove with investor-owned utilities to render rate
case decisions that inequitably harm Black, Brown, and low-income
communities.
A. Insufficient Public Notice Requirements
As noted above, after initiating a rate case in New York, an IOU
need only publish notice of the proposed rate increase in local newspapers once a week for four consecutive weeks at some point before the
effective date of the increase.212 The newspaper publication need not
contain any information about the proposed infrastructure projects that
would be driving the rate increase, the ongoing rate case, or how concerned ratepayers can intervene in the rate case.213 Thus, only if a ratepayer happens to read their county newspaper on one of the four days of

210 Benjamin K. Sovacool & Michael H. Dworkin, Energy Justice: Conceptual Insights
and Practical Applications, 142 APPLIED ENERGY 435, 436-37 (2015).
211 Id. at 437.
212 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 720-8.1 (2021); see also N.Y. PUB. SERV.
L. § 66(12)(b) (2019).
213 See sources cited supra note 212.
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publication would the ratepayer encounter the notice. In the event that a
ratepayer actually encounters the notice, the form and content of the notice—which are typically dense and inaccessible to a layperson—
discourage engagement.214 The inaccessibility of the notice prevents an
average ratepayer from clearly understanding what the notice is, in theory, intended to convey—that the ratepayer will likely see an increase in
their monthly energy bills.215 Even if the ratepayer walks away with this
minimal understanding, they are left in the dark as to what proposed
capital projects are driving the increase in their energy bills or how to
get involved in the decision-making process.
In February 2016, shortly after filing its first of two rate cases seeking cost recovery for the North Brooklyn Pipeline,216 National Grid published notices of the proposed rate hike in county newspapers, as legally
required.217 After informing ratepayers that National Grid “is proposing
an increase in delivery revenue of approximately $245 million for Calendar Year 2017 to address its revenue deficiency,” the notice listed current and proposed rates in various categories that a layperson would
likely not understand, such as “S.C. No. 1B-DG Residential Distributed
Generation Service” and “Service Classification No. 4A-High Load Factor Service.”218 The reasons provided for the rate hike were “substantially higher capital investment requirements”—that is, investments in the
North Brooklyn Pipeline and other unnamed infrastructure projects—
and “increases in operating costs that are not reflected in current
rates.”219 Even ratepayers who reviewed the notice carefully would not
have understood either how the proposed $245 million rate increase
would affect them or what specific investments and costs were being
used to justify the increase.220
In April 2019, National Grid filed its next rate case, seeking additional cost recovery for the North Brooklyn Pipeline as well as recovery
for the LNG Trucking Station and two new LNG vaporizers.221 Accord214

See infra Figures 3 and 4.
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 720-8.1 (2021); infra Figures 3 and 4.
216 See sources cited supra note 33.
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218 See infra Figure 3.
219 See infra Figure 3.
220 See infra Figure 3.
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ing to local newspaper notices published the following month, the Company sought “to increase delivery revenues by $236.8 million to modernize its infrastructure, support energy policy goals, and deliver safe
and reliable service in a rising cost environment.”222 The notice contained no information about the precise meaning of these objectives:
what infrastructure would be “modernize[d]” and how? What were National Grid’s “energy policy goals” and how would the proposed rate increase enable the company to meet them? Why was the rate increase
necessary to ensure “safe and reliable service”? Like the 2016 notice,
the 2019 notice entirely omitted mention of the capital infrastructure
projects driving the proposed rate hike—the North Brooklyn Pipeline,
LNG Trucking Station, and LNG vaporizers—and included an indecipherable table of current and proposed rates.223 In one respect, however,
the 2019 notice provided greater transparency than the prior notice—by
stating clearly that “a typical residential heating customer [would] see a
$16.66 monthly increase (11.99%) in their total bill.”224
According to Lee Ziesche of the community group Sane Energy
Project (“Sane Energy”), affected communities did not learn of National
Grid’s fracked gas infrastructure projects and rate increases until 2019,
well after the first of the two proposed rate hikes had been approved.225
Sane Energy became a party to the 2019 rate case after attending a training session about the rate case hosted by an allied nonprofit.226 As one
of Sane Energy’s representatives in the rate case, Ziesche prepared testimony, submitted discovery requests, cross-examined National Grid
employees and regulators at evidentiary hearings, and participated in
confidential settlement negotiations.227 Ziesche was interviewed for this
Article about her “insider” experience and insights as a party representative in the rate case.
During the first few months of the rate case, Sane Energy noticed
that National Grid was seeking cost recovery for an expensive project
called the “Metropolitan Reliability Infrastructure Project.”228 Recognizing that the project was, in fact, a massive fracked gas transmission
pipeline for which a significant amount of cost recovery had already

Gas Company d/b/a National Grid NY for Gas Service, 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub.
Serv. July 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/4E7J-K2ZP; see infra Figure 4.
222 See infra Figure 4.
223 See infra Figure 4.
224 See infra Figure 4.
225 Telephone Interview with Lee Ziesche, Deputy Director of Communications and Media, Sane Energy Project (Jan. 23, 2022).
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228 Id.; see generally GIOP KEDNY Filing Package, supra note 40, at 50-52.
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been approved in the prior rate case, Sane Energy sought more information about the pipeline through discovery requests.229 After consulting maps of the pipeline route obtained in discovery, Sane Energy members realized that the pipeline was being built through their
neighborhoods.230 Sane Energy began to build a coalition of community
groups, the No North Brooklyn Pipeline Coalition, to oppose the continued construction of the pipeline.231 By October 2019, the first three of
the pipeline’s five phases were complete, and the fourth phase was under construction.232
Thus, directly affected Black, Brown, and low-income communities
had no idea about National Grid’s plans to raise their utility bills and
build fracked gas infrastructure in their neighborhoods until one of two
rate increases had already been approved and much of the infrastructure
had been built. The public notice requirements imposed on IOUs in New
York are so woefully insufficient that an IOU can secure a massive rate
increase to undertake large-scale fossil fuel infrastructure projects in
marginalized communities without the slightest knowledge of those
communities. Ultimately, frontline communities learned about National
Grid’s plans not through newspaper notices but through their own initiative and organizing savvy.
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Figure 4

B. Setting the Rate Case Agenda and Framing the Terms of the Debate
In New York, a utility company initiates a rate case proceeding by
filing a request with the Department of Public Service.233 This initial filing, which contains the company’s proposed rate increase and justification for the increase, forms the basis of all future testimony and negotiations in the case.234 In other words, IOUs have the power to set the rate
case agenda and frame the terms of the debate.
As the scholar Robert Entman has written, “[f]raming essentially
involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient . . . in such a way as to
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”235 Thus, framing “operates by selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others.”236 The omission of problem definitions, causal interpretations, and recommendations is just as significant as inclusion, according
to Entman, because “[r]eceivers’ responses are clearly affected if they
233
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perceive and process information about one interpretation and possess
little or incommensurable data about alternatives.”237 In the news media
context, writes Entman, “the frame . . . is really the imprint of power—it
registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the
text.”238 News texts therefore “[r]eflect the play of power and boundaries of discourse over an issue,” and ideas that transcend these “boundaries of discourse” are “unlikely to influence policy.”239
The power of framing and agenda-setting is apparent in rate case
proceedings. When National Grid filed its 2016 rate case, the company
justified its proposed rate hike and associated capital infrastructure projects by repeatedly invoking objectives like safety, reliability, modernization, and expansion of gas infrastructure.240 These were the features
that National Grid selected and made salient in its framing of the rate
proposal. Emphasizing that its proposal would “deliver[] economic and
environmental benefits from gas expansion,”241 the company hailed “the
economic benefits of natural gas”242 and claimed that “[g]as growth”
and continued conversions of customers from oil to gas would “create[]
significant environmental benefits from lower emissions.”243 The assumption on which National Grid’s framing relied—that expansion of
gas infrastructure is economically and environmentally advantageous—
has been debunked by scientific literature.244 Studies have made clear
that oil-to-gas conversion will increase, rather than decrease, greenhouse
gas emissions due to methane leakage245 and that fossil fuel investments
will soon become stranded assets (that is, economically worthless) as
climate laws and policies are implemented.246 National Grid’s power to
frame its rate proposal meant that these faulty underlying assumptions
would be accepted unless challenged by regulators or intervenors. But
the Department of Public Service failed to evaluate the scientific soundness of National Grid’s justifications for the rate increase, and in fact,
the terms “methane,” “climate change,” and “greenhouse gas emissions”
237
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do not appear a single time in DPS’s testimony regarding the rate proposal.247 Meanwhile, community groups—who did not learn of National
Grid’s 2016 rate case until it was over—were not intervenors in the case
and therefore could not challenge the company’s claims.248 This demonstrates the power of framing and agenda-setting: the incorrect assumptions underlying National Grid’s rate proposal were simply accepted as
true.
National Grid also cited “increased customer demand for natural
gas”249 and touted the “Metropolitan Reliability Infrastructure (MRI)
project”—or North Brooklyn Pipeline—for its provision of an additional
850,000 dekatherms of gas capacity per day.250 Analyses have found,
however, that National Grid overestimates energy demand and wrongly
conflates it with gas demand: the rate of increase in energy demand has
slowed, and demand can be met through non-gas alternatives.251 In promoting a particular “problem definition”252 (how to meet “increased customer demand for natural gas”) and “treatment recommendation”253
(construction of the North Brooklyn Pipeline), National Grid omitted alternative “problem definitions” and thereby limited the frame of the debate: the “problem” that the company defined and placed on the agenda
would be the subject of the conversation, rather than any number of other priorities that might guide the ratemaking process—for example, how
to meet energy demand with exclusively non-gas alternatives.
Thus, the frame of National Grid’s rate filing was “the imprint of
power,” reflecting the “boundaries of discourse” about the proposed rate
hike.254 When community groups intervened in the company’s subsequent rate case in 2019 and raised concerns about the environmental justice and climate change implications of National Grid’s proposal, those
concerns were largely ignored by the company and DPS255 because they
247 See Staff Gas Infrastructure and Operations Panel Testimony, In re Rates, Charges,
Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No.
16-G-0059 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. May 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/4AB4-ZHE3.
248 See Matter Master: 16-00252/16-G-0059, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV.,
https://perma.cc/N4T7-ST9D (last visited July 31, 2022) (listing 32 parties to the action under the “Party List” tab, none of whom are community groups).
249 See KEDNY-KEDLI Book 1, supra note 37, at 7.
250 Id. at 38.
251 See TAKAHASHI ET AL., supra note 70, at 1-2, 13, 30; MATTEI, supra note 70, at 3-6,
20-21; INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS, supra note 70, at 1-3, 20.
252 Entman, supra note 235, at 52.
253 See id.
254 See id. at 55.
255 Order Approving Joint Proposal at 71-72, Rates, In re Charges, Rules and Reguls. of
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y.
State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Aug. 12, 2021) [hereinafter Order Approving Joint Proposal],
https://perma.cc/BL9J-HC5M; Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 75-80, In re Rates,
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“breached the bounds” of what National Grid had determined to be “acceptable discourse” about the rate proposal.256 In other words, environmental justice and climate change were not on the agenda that National
Grid had set. As Ziesche said, “[t]he foundation was all negotiating off
National Grid’s proposal. They got to put forth something that was insane and it was all negotiated from there.”257
Finally, another aspect of the rate case process exacerbates the
problem of agenda-setting by the IOU: the IOU’s prior rates are used as
the baseline for proposed increases.258 Rather than assessing rates anew,
the IOU and regulators assume prior rates as the starting point for an increase.259 The lack of any opportunity to challenge these base rates is
another function of the IOU’s agenda-setting power. Leading energy
scholar Heather Payne has advocated for the use of a budgeting method
called zero-based planning in utility rate cases.260 With zero-based planning, rate increases would not be connected to prior rates.261 Instead, the
ratemaking process would “start[] from zero,” all assumptions would be
explicitly acknowledged and vetted, and “automatic, incremental increases” would be “specifically disallow[ed].”262 According to Payne,
since “[t]he use of [zero-based planning] requires the justification of
every dollar spent,” this budgeting method would “further[] the goal of
complete transparency and invit[e] a conversation around what the future state of our [utility] system should be.”263
C. Information Asymmetry and Lack of Transparency
The principle of “good governance”—that is, “democratic and
transparent decision-making processes” in which “all people . . . have
access to high-quality information about energy and the environment”—
is central to energy justice.264 Utility rate cases, however, are characterized by steep “information asymmetry” and a lack of transparency.265
Indeed, Payne has attributed the failure of the regulatory compact to information asymmetry between rate case parties, arguing that utility reguCharges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv.,
Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. July 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/
WR2K-WALM.
256 See Entman, supra note 235, at 55.
257 Ziesche, supra note 225.
258 Payne, supra note 57, at 1050.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 1039-43.
261 Id. at 1039.
262 Id. at 1008.
263 Id.
264 Sovacool & Dworkin, supra note 210, at 436, 439.
265 Payne, supra note 57, at 1034.
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lation “fails to deliver on the public benefits of the regulatory compact”266 because “monopolistic cost-of-service utilities are not providing
enough information to enable meaningful regulation and oversight.”267
As described above, IOUs have a “perverse incentive” to invest in
capital infrastructure on which they can earn a profit.268 Information
asymmetry compounds this problem during rate case proceedings because “the regulated monopoly utility is in complete control of the information that would indicate when a solution other than spending utility capital and adding that amount to the rate base would be beneficial to
consumers.”269 That is, since IOUs have a financial incentive to invest in
capital infrastructure and are often in exclusive possession of information about alternatives to capital investment that would better serve
the interests of ratepayers, these alternatives may not even make it onto
the table of rate case proceedings. When it comes to utility ratemaking
and the range of potential options for meeting customers’ needs, regulators and intervenors necessarily operate at a severe information disadvantage because they “don’t know what they don’t know.”
During National Grid’s 2016 rate case, regulators failed to question
or challenge the need for the North Brooklyn Pipeline, and community
groups—unaware of the company’s plans at this stage—were not there
to force the issue.270 After community groups became parties to National
Grid’s subsequent rate case in 2019271 and expressed vocal opposition to
the pipeline and other capital investments throughout the first year of the
proceeding,272 the Department of Public Service served National Grid
with a discovery request about the need for the remaining portions of the

266

Id. at 1000, 1007.
Id. at 1007.
268 See supra Part II.
269 Payne, supra note 57, at 1036.
270 See generally Matter Master: 16-00252/16-G-0059, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV.,
https://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=1
6-g-0059.
271 See sources cited supra note 6.
272 See, e.g., Sane Energy Project Supplemental Testimony, In re Rates, Charges, Rules
and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Jan. 30, 2020), perma.cc/39ZE-447Z; Ruling On Party
Status, In re Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas
Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. June 5, 2019),
https://perma.cc/ZHY6-V3RW; Ruling on Party Status, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and
Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G0309, Sr. No. 866 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. July 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/JZU7DC8H; Ruling on Party Status, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union
Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309, Sr. No. 679 (N.Y. State
Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Oct. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/CR4F-9ZVR.
267

2022]

REGULATORY THEATER

391

pipeline.273 Although this was a positive step by regulators (no doubt a
result of the pressure exerted by community intervenors), National
Grid’s response to the discovery request274 illustrates how powerfully
IOUs can use information asymmetry to their advantage. DPS asked National Grid to describe and quantify the benefits of the pipeline under
three scenarios: if no further work were completed, if only four of the
pipeline’s five phases were completed, and if all five phases were completed (as proposed).275 DPS also asked the company to “explain and
quantify the alternatives to completing Phase 5,” which would terminate
at National Grid’s LNG facility in Greenpoint.276
National Grid’s responses indicated that the North Brooklyn Pipeline needed to be constructed in its entirety and that there were no viable
long-term alternatives to completion of Phase 5.277 The company also
emphasized the need for additional LNG and Compressed Natural Gas
(“CNG”) supplies at the Greenpoint facility by winter 2021-22.278 Increased LNG and CNG supplies, the company argued, would make the
need for Phase 5 of the pipeline even more urgent because the takeaway
capability of the existing system was insufficient to handle the transmission of additional gas from the Greenpoint facility.279 In short, according
to National Grid, capital spending on gas infrastructure was the only
path forward.
Subsequent events, however, cast serious doubt on the company’s
claims. After insisting that CNG was needed at the Greenpoint facility,
National Grid withdrew its bid to build two new CNG injection heaters
(in the hopes that abandoning plans for CNG would help clear the path
for approval of two new LNG vaporizers).280 In the face of massive public opposition, the company’s application for new LNG vaporizers has
still not been approved, over two years after its submission.281 Winter
2021-22 has come and gone without any additional CNG or LNG at the
Greenpoint facility, and Phase 5 of the North Brooklyn Pipeline has
been paused, with the Public Service Commission declining (for now) to
273

See Exhibit 735 (Response to IR DPS-1091), supra note 98, at 1-3.
Id.
275 Id. at 2-3.
276 Id. at 3.
277 See id. at 11.
278 See id.
279 See id. at 10-11.
280 Exhibit 845-Monitor’s 8th Q Report at 4, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y.
State Dep’t of Pub. June 22, 2021) [hereinafter Exhibit 845-Monitor’s 8th Q Report], perma.cc/VG9P-6J89.
281 Tom DiChristopher, National Grid Running Out of NY Gas Supply Options Amid
Permit Delays – Utility, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Jan. 7, 2022), perma.cc/H8XY-QMVU.
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approve rate recovery for the final phase.282 Thus, none of the infrastructure that National Grid claimed was absolutely necessary has materialized. Indeed, an independent monitor appointed by New York State has
noted National Grid’s pattern of “mov[ing] the goalposts” on proposed
infrastructure projects—that is, repeatedly claiming that a project must
be in service by a certain date, failing to meet that deadline, and then
setting a new target date.283 According to the monitor, the company continually “miss[es] key milestones on a project while nevertheless maintaining that all is well because, according to National Grid, the project
will be completed by the ultimate time it is truly ‘needed.’”284 Importantly, the company “moved the goalposts” not only on the timelines
of proposed projects, but also on what projects are “needed” at all: CNG
infrastructure was initially presented as essential (and used as part of the
justification for the North Brooklyn Pipeline) and later abandoned.285
The problem of information asymmetry in rate cases is compounded by IOUs’ regular invocation of confidentiality to avoid sharing information.286 Under New York regulations, an IOU may request “trade
secret” or “confidential commercial” status for information submitted to
the Department of Public Service if the information “would be likely to
cause substantial injury to the competitive position” of the IOU.287 Factors to be considered in making this determination include “the extent to
which the disclosure would cause unfair economic or competitive damage” and “the worth or value of the information to the [IOU] and the
[IOU’s] competitors.”288 As Payne has written, however, “[t]hese are
regulated monopoly businesses. Simply by definition, they are not in
competition with anyone—a regulated monopoly utility is a noncompetitive business. Therefore, any claim that a regulated monopoly
utility needs to have business information kept confidential for competitive reasons is absurd. There is no competition.”289
Nevertheless, National Grid successfully invoked trade secret protection or business confidentiality at least five different times during the
2016 rate case, arguing, for example, that a report about the company’s
282

Order Approving Joint Proposal, supra note 255, at 84-85.
See Exhibit 842-Monitor 5th Q Report 9-18-20 at 3, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and
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284 See Exhibit 844-Monitor 7th Q Report 12-18-20 at 3, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and
Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309
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“operation and maintenance of natural gas distribution facilities” was
“commercially sensitive” and “would unfairly benefit outside parties
and place [the company] at a competitive disadvantage” if publicly disclosed.290 National Grid also sought to prevent public disclosure of its
employees’ financial information.291 As Payne has argued, “[g]iven that
captive ratepayers are paying [IOU employees’] salaries, [salary] information should be available to regulators, public staff, intervenors, and
the general public.”292
The rate case discovery process—in which any party can serve any
other party with Information Requests—is presumably intended to rectify the steep information asymmetry between parties to the proceeding
and, more broadly, facilitate transparency and public oversight of
IOUs.293 Discovery rules require rate case parties in New York to “fully
disclose to each other, upon request, all information (including data,
records, objects, and documents) relevant and material to [the] proceeding . . . and any information likely to lead to such information.”294 A
party receiving an Information Request must provide responses and produce requested documents within ten days.295 Parties can also request
that the Public Service Commission “authorize other forms of discovery,
including oral depositions and inspection of sites, facilities, or original
documents.”296 Thus, the discovery process enables parties to access information that would otherwise be unobtainable and is critical for informed evaluation of IOUs’ proposed rate increases.

290 See Request for Exception from Disclosure, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls.
of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 16-G-0059 (N.Y.
State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. May 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/P4M9-TCHV; see also Request for
Exception from Disclosure, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas
Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 16-G-0059 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv.
Apr. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Request for Exception from Disclosure (Apr. 11, 2016)], https://
perma.cc/FUM4-78ES; Request for Exception from Disclosure, In re Rates, Charges, Rules
and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 16-G0059 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. April 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/2N4K-NKD4; Request
for Exception from Disclosure, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union
Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 16-G-0059 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub.
Serv. Apr. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/SJ5R-UNHN; Request for Exception from Disclosure,
In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for
Gas Serv., Case No. 16-G-0059 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Mar. 30, 2018),
https://perma.cc/8JE9-SZ3S.
291 See Request for Exception from Disclosure (Apr. 11, 2016), supra note 290.
292 Payne, supra note 57, at 1046.
293 See N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 5.1(a) (2021).
294 Id.
295 Id. at §§ 5.3, 5.4, 5.5.
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In practice, however, the discovery process is limited and fails to
ensure full transparency, public oversight, and accountability. When
Sane Energy submitted discovery requests to National Grid and the City
of New York in the 2019 rate case, asking for information about the status of environmental approval for the company’s LNG Trucking Station
(one of the capital projects for which National Grid sought rate recovery), both the company and the City objected to the requests on the
ground that they were not “relevant and material”297 to the proposed distribution rates at issue in the proceeding.298 Sane Energy challenged this
narrow interpretation of the “relevant and material” standard, arguing
that access to basic information about environmental approval for capital projects is essential to assessing the validity of cost recovery for
those projects.299 If, for example, National Grid were proceeding with a
capital project for which it has not obtained required environmental approval, then the company should not be permitted to recover the costs of
that project from ratepayers. Ultimately, National Grid and the City provided Sane Energy with limited information that failed to fully address
the concerns raised.300
In addition to evading production of relevant materials by citing
limitations on the scope of discovery, National Grid also concealed at
least one key document during discovery, according to Sane Energy.301
The document was directly responsive to three different Information
Requests submitted by Sane Energy, but consistently omitted from National Grid’s responses to these Information Requests.302 Sane Energy
297

See id. at § 5.1(a).
See Request No. SANE-35, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls. of the Brooklyn
Union Gas Company d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv., Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State
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happened to discover the existence of the document through a subsequent lawsuit filed against National Grid.303 It is highly plausible that
such concealment or omission by IOUs is par for the course but rarely
discovered by regulators or intervenors since IOUs are generally in exclusive possession of information requested in discovery and there is no
enforcement mechanism for disclosure. Moreover, as Sane Energy suspects, IOUs may be emboldened to conceal or omit key responsive documents when the requesting party is not represented by an attorney;304 as
described further below, resource constraints often preclude community
groups like Sane Energy from having legal representation in rate cases.305
Finally, one of the clearest manifestations of non-transparency in
utility rate cases is the confidential settlement negotiation process. As
described above, at any point during a rate case in New York, an IOU
can notify the parties that it wishes to negotiate a settlement—that is, arrive at an agreed-upon Joint Proposal.306 All settlement negotiations between the parties are strictly confidential:307 community members affected by the outcome of the rate case have no seat at the table unless
they are registered parties, which the vast majority of community members are not (in large part due to the time-and-resource-intensive nature
of the rate case process, as described below). Thus, community groups
cannot relay the contents of settlement talks to the community members
they represent and solicit input or feedback without violating the confidentiality rules of the negotiations. Community members therefore remain in the dark not only about the IOU’s plans and intentions, but also
about regulators’ positions and the extent to which regulators challenge—or fail to challenge—the IOU. As Ziesche explained:
We couldn’t consult with the community about the result of the
rate hike and whether it would actually benefit them. [The confidentiality requirement] limits who can be involved. The
amount of time needed to participate as a party to the rate case
means that working class people can’t be involved . . . . We
couldn’t talk [publicly] about how good of a job the state did
(on file with authors), https://perma.cc/C53N-HHZR; Request No. SANE-36, In re Rates,
Charges, Rules and Reguls. of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a Nat’l Grid NY for Gas Serv.,
Case No. 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Pub. Serv. July 2, 2021) (on file with authors),
https://perma.cc/SX9H-N5RS; Exhibit J, Sane Energy Project v. City of New York, No.
518354/2021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. Aug. 4, 2021).
303 Id.
304 Ziesche, supra note 225.
305 See infra Part III-D.
306 Berkley & Wheelock, supra note 168.
307 Id. at 9.
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fighting for us. If we learned something that might be harmful to
the community or that the community might want to know, we
couldn’t tell them.308
Generally, public hearings in the affected service areas are held only after negotiations are over and an agreed-upon Joint Proposal has
been issued309—when it is too late to meaningfully participate in the
process.
D. Communities’ Lack of Resources and Technical Expertise
In an open acknowledgment of the generally limited or nonexistent
role of the public in utility rate cases, the vice chairman of the Montana
Public Service Commission noted in 2017, “[a] regulator should not be
mistaken: the parties appearing before him are not the public, and the
interests of stakeholders together do not constitute the public interest.”310 In theory, community members affected by the outcome of a rate
case can weigh in on proposed distribution rates and capital infrastructure projects by becoming parties to the proceeding, submitting testimony, gathering information through the discovery process, crossexamining the IOU and regulators during evidentiary hearings, and participating in settlement negotiations.311 In reality, however, the typical
energy consumer lacks the time, resources, and technical expertise
needed to meaningfully participate in a utility rate case.312
The rate case process is “difficult for the average citizen to understand,”313 and mounting an effective challenge to an IOU’s rate filing
requires a “high degree of specialized knowledge”314 about engineering,
accounting, economics, law, environmental science, and the utility industry.315 Well-resourced rate case parties can hire experts and attorneys, but community groups and members of the public rarely have sufficient resources for expert consultants or legal representation.316 Unlike
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in other administrative proceedings in New York, the state does not provide funds for community intervenors in utility rate cases to pay for experts or lawyers.317
During an evidentiary hearing in the 2019 rate case, Sane Energy
asked National Grid whether the company had conducted any assessments of its proposed capital projects’ greenhouse gas emissions and
impact on disadvantaged communities.318 National Grid confirmed that
no such assessments had been undertaken.319 Sane Energy lacked the resources to hire a greenhouse gas emissions expert or environmental justice expert to conduct these assessments, which could have significantly
bolstered community groups’ contention that National Grid’s fracked
gas infrastructure projects did not comply with the Climate Leadership
and Community Protection Act.320 Under the CLCPA, a state agency
making any type of decision—in this case, the utility regulatory agency
(Public Service Commission) and its staff arm (Department of Public
Service)—has an affirmative obligation to ensure that the decision (1) is
not “inconsistent with” or will not “interfere with the attainment of the
statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits” imposed by the CLCPA; and
(2) will not “disproportionately burden disadvantaged communities.”321
Notwithstanding this obligation, DPS neither required National Grid to
conduct climate and environmental justice impact assessments nor conducted the assessments itself.322 Thus, regulators failed to carry out their
responsibilities—a symptom of regulatory capture, as described below—and community groups lacked the resources to “do the state’s
job,” as Ziesche put it:
We were able to put forth a good enough argument for the state
to ask more questions. But the state didn’t do that. DPS didn’t
do a CLCPA assessment . . . . We didn’t have the resources to
get an expert to say “these are what the actual greenhouse gas
317
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emissions are” or “these are the impacts on disadvantaged communities.” If we don’t do the state’s job, they don’t do it either.323
Participation in utility rate cases is also a time-intensive endeavor.324 Rate cases can span 11 months.325 The 2019 National Grid rate
case continued for nearly two and a half years.326 A typical community
member working for 40 hours or more per week simply does not have
the time to review and digest rate case documents, draft Information Requests, prepare testimony, and participate in months of negotiations.327
As Ziesche said, “[f]or the first year of the rate case, I was only [a] parttime [employee at Sane Energy]. I was going from rate case meetings to
serving at a restaurant. There are thousands and thousands of pages of
documents. You need time to go through it all, and somebody needs to
train you to understand what it all means.”328
E. Regulatory Capture
The phenomenon of “regulatory capture” describes “the process
through which regulated monopolies end up manipulating the state
agencies that [we]re [designed] to control them.”329 Energy scholar
Heather Payne has argued that state public utility commissions and
IOUs “play a ‘game’” driven by regulatory capture.330 In the utility rate
case context, two mechanisms of regulatory capture are particularly salient: (1) the IOU’s ability to define and manipulate the standards that
govern its own regulation; and (2) the use of negotiation to reach resolution, despite the monopoly status of IOUs and the absence of key conditions needed for successful negotiation.331
323
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the industry down the road. Payne, supra note 329, at 83. In New York, two of the seven
members of the Public Service Commission were formerly employed by a utility company
and the remaining five previously held government positions; none of the commissioners
324
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First, IOUs have defined and manipulated the seemingly neutral
and public interest-oriented principles that guide public utility commissions’ decisions—“safety,”332 “reliability,”333 and “reasonable rates”334
—in a manner that prioritizes the financial viability of utility companies
over the interests of ratepayers. In New York, utility companies are statutorily obligated to provide “safe, adequate, and reliable” service,335
and—as is apparent in National Grid’s rate filings and public notices—
IOUs justify their proposed rate hikes and capital spending by invoking
this very imperative,336 manipulating these standards to serve their own
interests.
In arguing that the North Brooklyn Pipeline and other fracked gas
infrastructure is necessary for the company to provide safe, adequate,
and reliable service,337 National Grid has depended on a narrow interpretation of this standard that favors increases in capital spending. Across
the utility sector, IOUs narrowly interpret their obligation to provide
“adequate” and “reliable” service as their “ability . . . to meet demand at
any given time,” and regulators accept this interpretation.338 An IOU
considers its gas system “reliable” when the system’s capacity to transhave backgrounds in consumer protection or environmental justice. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T
PUB. SERV., supra note 148 (click on each commissioner’s name for biographical information). Second, the demographic composition of state public utility commissions exacerbates the problem of regulatory capture: predominantly white, male, and “mid to high
wealth” utility commissioners often fail to act in the interest of Black, Brown, and lowincome communities. See Engaging With Public Utilities and Public Service Commissions,
NAACP, https://perma.cc/K3GC-M7YH (last visited Apr. 26, 2022); see also Stanley Dunlap, Lawsuit Charges PSC At-Large Elections Unfair to Black Voters, GA. REC., (July 15,
2020) https://perma.cc/PSQ5-7TSA. Mississippi, which is 48% African American, has never
had a Black commissioner, and Georgia has had only one Black commissioner in the agency’s 107-year history. Engaging With Public Utilities and Public Service Commissions,
NAACP, https://perma.cc/9BVR-XKXX (last visited Apr. 26, 2022). As the NAACP has
noted, the demographic composition of public utility commissions “is significant, given the
disproportionate location of energy production facilities in low income communities of color” and the “disparate impact [of utility rates] on women, communities of color[,] and low
income communities.” Id.
332 See Safety, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGUL. UTIL. COMM’RS, https://perma.cc/UJ6S-2QJ3 (last
visited Apr. 26, 2022).
333 See Reliability, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGUL. UTIL. COMM’RS, https://perma.cc/T5K9W3WJ (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
334 See Reasonable Rates, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGUL. UTIL. COMM’RS, https://perma.cc/
6HLQ-GGLD (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
335 N.Y. PUB. SERV. L. § 65(14) (2021).
336 See Affidavits and Proofs of Publication at 3, In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Reguls.
of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. d/b/a National Grid NY for Gas Serv., 19-G-0309 (N.Y. State
Dep’t of Pub. Serv. June 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/J5F3-UR4R; KEDNY-KEDLI Book 1,
supra note 37, at 5.
337 KEDNY-KEDLI Book 1, supra note 37, at 4, 36-39.
338 Fendell, supra note 3, at 827.
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mit and distribute gas exceeds demand on a day of extreme cold weather
called “Design Day.”339 National Grid calculates this peak demand using
Design Day conditions of 0° F in Central Park for 24 hours—a scenario
that last occurred in 1934.340 Since additional capital infrastructure unquestionably increases National Grid’s capacity to transmit and distribute gas, the company “has tied the reliability of its service to its [profitgenerating] rate base.”341 To justify construction of new fracked gas infrastructure, National Grid has successfully argued that more infrastructure is needed to meet gas demand in the event of (a highly unlikely)
Design Day scenario and that the adequacy and reliability of the system
depend on the company’s ability to meet demand under these extreme
circumstances.342 Thus, National Grid uses the regulatory standard of
“adequacy” and “reliability” to promote its own profit interest by equating the standard with the company’s ability to meet demand, overforecasting this demand, and conditioning the ability to meet demand on
construction of additional capital infrastructure.
“Captured” regulators, moreover, simply accepted National Grid’s
interpretation of the standard, failing to use the full extent of their authority to adopt a more expansive interpretation that would protect marginalized communities and the climate. Although utility regulators in
New York have statutory authority to pursue state goals of energy efficiency,343 public safety,344 environmental preservation,345 and conservation,346 the Department of Public Service did not insist on a holistic conception of “adequacy” and “reliability”347 that might have considered,
for example, whether new fracked gas infrastructure can possibly be
considered “reliable” in an era of imminent climate catastrophe.
Throughout the 2019 rate case, community groups argued that as New
York phases out fossil fuel infrastructure on the timeline required by the
Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, gas infrastructure
projects will soon become stranded assets that must be retired well before the end of their useful lives.348 Ratepayers will be saddled with the
costs of National Grid’s projects for decades after the projects are re339

See id.; Design Day Definition, LAW INSIDER, https://perma.cc/3B49-3AF4 (last visited Apr. 19, 2022); see, e.g., NAT’L GRID, supra note 44, at 27.
340 NAT’L GRID, supra note 44, at 27.
341 Cf. Fendell, supra note 3, at 827.
342 See generally, NAT’L GRID, supra note 44.
343 N.Y. PUB. SERV. L. § 65 (2021).
344 Id. at § 5(2).
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 See generally, Order Approving Joint Proposal, supra note 255, at 56, 62, 71, 73, 7980, 86, 95, 117-18, 128.
348 See, e.g., Sane Energy Project Supplemental Testimony, supra note 272, at 10-11.
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tired—a factor that regulators might have weighed in their assessment of
“reliability.”
Similarly, the severe safety and health consequences of National
Grid’s North Brooklyn Pipeline and LNG infrastructure—including methane emissions, risks of pipeline incidents, and LNG-related explosion
risks349—seemingly did not factor into regulators’ assessment of the
company’s ability to provide “safe” service: DPS expressed no such
concerns, and it was left to community intervenors to raise these issues
on their own.350 During an evidentiary hearing, Sane Energy asked DPS
to describe the factors that DPS considers in its assessment of “safety.”351 At one point in cross-examination, the community group asked:
“[W]hat is safe and reliable? In the word safe, are you looking at all the
public health impacts included with things like emissions and pollutants?”352 Regulators repeatedly evaded the question, even when pressed
to respond.353
As for the rates that an IOU can charge its customers, “[t]he wellknown, oft-repeated mantra of the utility regulator is that rates must be
‘just and reasonable’”354—a standard echoed in New York’s utility regulation statute.355 To determine “just and reasonable” utility rates, the Supreme Court has applied the “prudent-investment rule,” which bases
rates on “the cost of prudently invested capital used to provide the service.”356 According to the Court, the prudent-investment rule:
addressed the natural temptations on the utilities’ part to claim a
return on outlays producing nothing of value to the public. It
was meant . . . to discourage unnecessary investment . . . and so
to protect ratepayers from supporting excessive capacity, or
abandoned, destroyed, or phantom assets . . . . But the mitigation
was too little, the prudent-investment rule in practice often being
no match for the capacity of utilities having all the relevant in-

349

See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
See generally Matter Master: 16-00252/16-G-0059, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV.,
https://perma.cc/8BZ9-WWBW (last visited July 31, 2022); see generally Matter Master:
19-01092/19-G-0309, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., https://perma.cc/5EDZ-RGFS (last
visited Apr. 19, 2022) (finding in a review of the 887 documents filed in the 2019 rate case
and the 506 documents filed in the 2016 rate case found that the Department of Public Service never expressed concern about the safety and health consequences of National Grid’s
North Brooklyn Pipeline and LNG infrastructure).
351 Order Approving Joint Proposal, supra note 255, at 53.
352 Id. at 57.
353 See id. at 53-58.
354 Mapes et al., supra note 62, at 342.
355 N.Y. PUB. SERV. L. § 65(1) (McKinney 2022).
356 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 535 U.S. 467, 484-85 (2002).
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formation to manipulate the rate base and renegotiate the rate of
return every time a rate was set.357
Thus, the prudent-investment rule is intended to disincentivize unnecessary capital spending by rewarding IOUs with cost recovery for
prudent investments only—that is, investments that are essential for service provision and will not yield stranded assets.358 However, as the
Court recognized, the prudent-investment rule falls short in practice because IOUs can easily manipulate it.359 As Payne has noted, “[m]any investments can be deemed sufficient, prudent, and acceptable. When everything between 0% and 100% . . . of what the utilities ask for can be
granted, with essentially no judicial oversight of the decision, the regulatory system becomes the very definition of arbitrary and capricious.”360
Since IOUs set the rate case agenda361 and are in exclusive control of
key information,362 they can easily frame their capital investments as
“prudent” and their proposed rates as “just and reasonable.” If regulators
fail—as they did in the National Grid rate cases—to adequately probe,
challenge, and interrogate the assumptions underlying this framing, then
the framing is simply accepted as true.363
In short, by allowing IOUs to define and manipulate the standards
that govern utility rate case decision-making, regulators have effectively
yielded the rate case terrain to IOUs. DPS’s failure to critically scrutinize and question National Grid’s claims about the safety, reliability,
and prudence of its proposed capital investments was a manifestation of
regulatory capture. One potential explanation of this failure is that regulators misconceive their role and purpose: rather than defining the rights
and obligations of consumers and IOUs (which would require articulation and interpretation of the relevant standards) and then protecting
consumers’ rights and enforcing IOUs’ obligations, regulators are instead fixated on “balancing” the interests of the two parties.364 This balancing test inevitably favors the more powerful party in the proceeding—that is, the party setting the agenda and controlling the terms of the
debate through selective information provision.365
The second prominent mechanism of capture in utility rate cases is
the use of a negotiated process to achieve resolution, despite the absence
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365

Id. at 486.
Id.
Id.
Payne, supra note 329, at 78-79.
See supra Part III-B.
See supra Part III-C.
See supra Part III-B.
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of key conditions needed for successful negotiations.366 As a preliminary
matter, negotiations do not make sense in the rate case context because
of “the basic tenet of monopolies: utilities should only request what they
need, given that they have no competition.”367 If IOUs did, in fact, request only what they need, then there would be no negotiations. But
IOUs seek distribution rates far in excess of need: according to a comprehensive quantitative analysis of electric utility rate cases from 2002
to 2015, “utilities were on average granted approximately half of what
they requested.”368 As the author of the analysis noted, if IOUs actually
needed the entirety of what they requested—only to receive about half—
ratepayers would witness “significant deterioration” of infrastructure
and “lack of capital expenditures,” and IOUs would be unable “to attract
investors.”369 None of this has come to pass.370 Thus, it is only because
of the failure of the monopoly utility system that rate case negotiations
occur in the first place.
Moreover, the lack of meaningful public involvement in utility rate
cases and absence of affected communities from the negotiating table—
largely due to the technical expertise, time, and resources needed to participate in the proceedings371—have made the negotiation process farcical in nature, enabling IOUs and regulators to “play a ‘game’” in which
the IOU requests more than twice what it needs, regulators reduce the
requested amount by about half, and both parties claim success.372
Even if the public were meaningfully involved, several of the conditions needed for successful negotiations are missing in the utility rate
case context. In a seminal 1982 article, the scholar Philip J. Harter proposed a set of conditions under which, he predicted, regulatory negotiations would be more likely to succeed.373 Most notably, “the countervailing power among the parties” must be “balanced such that the
outcome of the conflict is genuinely in doubt,” wrote Harter.374 In utility
rate cases, the imbalance of power between the parties is too steep for
negotiations to be successful.375 Harter also advocated for the establishment of deadlines in the negotiation process.376 As others have noted,
366
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“[w]ithout a deadline, parties may purposefully delay or fail to focus on
reaching a settlement.”377 In the 2019 National Grid rate case, community groups pointed to the lack of a deadline—and its consequences—as
one of the major reasons they walked out of confidential settlement negotiations.378 In the press release announcing their walk-out, community
members expressed frustration that after nine months of negotiations, no
settlement had been reached.379 In the meantime, National Grid had continued construction of the very fracked gas infrastructure at issue in the
rate case.380 Thus, the protracted negotiations enabled the company to
create facts on the ground that would make it increasingly difficult for
the Public Service Commission to deny rate recovery. Regulators are extremely reluctant to deny rate recovery for infrastructure that is already
built (as evidenced by the PSC’s ultimate approval of recovery for all
completed portions of the North Brooklyn Pipeline) because denial of
rate recovery for existing infrastructure would cause an IOU greater financial harm than denial of recovery for investments not yet made.381 In
addition, as noted above, the Joint Proposal that emerges from negotiations need not be agreed upon by all parties or even most parties at the
table.382 Other than National Grid and New York State agencies, the only parties that supported the Joint Proposal were a real estate company,
two nonprofit organizations, and an individual member of the public.383
Seven organizations or companies and 15 individual members of the
public submitted statements in opposition to the Joint Proposal.384 Thus,
the PSC ultimately approved a rate plan that a significant number of parties opposed.
After the PSC voted to approve the controversial Joint Proposal,385
the PSC’s performance—in which the agency purported to deal a blow
377 Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 140 (1985) (discussing the theory and practices of negotiated rulemaking).
378 See Press Release, No N. Brooklyn Pipeline, Citing Continuing Construction of Controversial Fracked Gas Projects, Environmental Groups and NYC Comptroller Walk out of
Downstate National Grid Rate Case Negotiations Calling the Process “an Undemocratic Path
to Climate Disaster” (Mar. 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/83QD-VAFH.
379 See id.
380 See id.; see also Climate Activists Arrested in NYC After Shutting Down Construction
of North Brooklyn Pipeline, DEMOCRACY NOW (Oct. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/2YVR9A7V.
381 See id.; Donovan, supra note 46.
382 See Berkley & Wheelock, supra note 168, at 9.
383 See Order Approving Joint Proposal, supra note 255, at 234.
384 See Matter Master: 19-01092/19-G-0309, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV.,
https://perma.cc/Y4KV-TK4P (filter by “Joint Proposals and Stipulations” and search for
“opposition”) (last visited May 12, 2022).
385 See Order Approving Joint Proposal, supra note 255.
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to National Grid while actually paving the way for the company’s capital infrastructure projects—was a demonstration of regulatory capture,
made all the more apparent by National Grid’s satisfaction with the outcome.386 Issuing a press release that declared, “PSC Dramatically Slashes National Grid Rate Hike Request,” the PSC emphasized that the approved rate plan was “dramatically lower than what the company had
initially requested” and repeatedly invoked the Climate Leadership and
Community Protection Act.387 A sub-headline of the press release proclaimed, “CLCPA Requirements Made Core Component of Historic
Decision Designed to Reduce Amount of Natural Gas Being Sold”388—
even though the Joint Proposal did not deny rate recovery for any
fracked gas infrastructure (but rather, approved recovery for some infrastructure and permitted National Grid to seek recovery for the rest in the
future).389 Meanwhile, National Grid also hailed the outcome of the rate
case: “The [PSC’s approval of the Joint Proposal] will allow us to prioritize energy affordability while investing in programs necessary to maintain the safety and reliability of our natural gas networks,” the company
stated.390 The “game” that National Grid and the PSC had just finished
was on full display—and both players had won.
CONCLUSION
This Article has used the 2016 and 2019 National Grid rate cases to
illustrate the procedural injustice of the utility regulation system in New
York, as well as the substantive—and disproportionately adverse—
consequences of this procedural injustice for Black, Brown, and lowincome communities. As evidenced above, utility rate cases fail to meet
the four elements of procedural justice laid out by Sovacool and
Dworkin391: (1) affected communities lack access to information as a result of steep information asymmetry and the IOU’s ability to withhold
information that does not align with its financial interests; (2) affected
communities cannot access or meaningfully participate in decisionmaking due to insufficient public notice requirements, the power of the
IOU to set the rate case agenda and frame the terms of the decisionmaking process, communities’ lack of resources and technical expertise,
and confidentiality rules that shroud settlement negotiations in secrecy;
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(3) regulators are “captured” by the IOU and therefore biased; and (4)
affected communities are generally unable to challenge unfavorable rate
case decisions in court because they lack the significant resources required to bring legal proceedings.392
The substantive consequences of this procedural injustice are patent
and include the disproportionate location of fossil fuel infrastructure—
and its attendant health and safety effects—in marginalized communities; adverse impacts on greenhouse gas emissions and the climate; and
increases in ratepayers’ energy burdens and energy insecurity, which
disproportionately affect Black, Brown, and low-income households.393
While ostensibly neutral, utility regulation procedures facilitate the
inequitable distribution of environmental harms resulting from the activities of the utility sector. Attempts to rectify these procedures, moreover,
cannot cure the deeper problem of which procedural injustice is merely
a symptom: the private, profit-driven utility model at the heart of our
energy system. The perverse financial incentives that drive IOUs are
fundamentally incompatible with environmental and energy justice, energy democracy, and energy sovereignty: as long as these incentives exist, regulators—with the assistance of an “investor-oriented” legal
standard—will continue to prioritize the financial viability of utility
companies over the interests of ratepayers, and utilities will remain unaccountable to the communities directly affected by their operations.
There is, however, a viable path forward: the current regime of investor-owned utilities must be replaced with an alternative, publiclyowned energy system.394 Public ownership of utilities is neither new in
the United States (consumer-owned utilities currently provide electricity
services to about 25% of the U.S. population)395 nor a panacea for systemic racism in our energy system.396 Nevertheless, transitioning from
utilities centered on shareholder profits to utilities centered on the needs
of customer-owners is a crucial first step to fully democratizing energy
and realizing the goals of environmental and energy justice. Only when
communities are no longer dependent on profit-driven monopolies for
essential services and have seized control and ownership of energy resources and decision-making can we begin to develop an energy system
grounded in racial, economic, and environmental justice.
392

See supra Part III.
See supra Part I-C.
394 See Johanna Bozuwa, Public Ownership for Energy Democracy, DEMOCRACY
COLLABORATIVE (Sept. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/96PK-SWNZ.
395 See JIM LAZAR ET AL., ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 12 (2d ed.
2016), https://perma.cc/2WNN-3SC9.
396 See John Farrel, Being Black Still a Barrier to Rural Cooperative Board Membership,
ILSR (May 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/SM6X-A4A7.
393

